78 THE ARMED CAMP, 1745-56flanked in this way, may be beaten by 30,000, because the issue is
decided so quickly' (Oeuvres, XXVIII, 74).
As the leader of an army with an unbroken run of five victories to
its credit, Frederick could proclaim with some enthusiasm: 'Battles
determine the destiny of states. When you go to war you must seek to
bring on a rapid decision - whether to extricate yourself from an
embarrassment, to put the enemy at a disadvantage of the same kind,
or in order to finish a quarrel that might otherwise drag on indefinite-
ly' (Oeuvres, XXVIII, 83). Transferring these principles to the
strategic plane, Frederick added: 'our wars must be short and lively. It
is not at all in our interests to engage in protracted campaigning. A
war of any length would bring about a slow destruction of our
admirable discipline; it would depopulate our country, and sap our
resources' (ibid., 84).
In the final articles Frederick dealt interestingly with the ele-
ment of chance in warfare, the evils of councils of war, and the cost of
winter campaigns, returning in Article XXIX to his new battle
tactics, a system 'founded on the speed of eveiy movement and the
necessity of being on the attack' (Oeuvres, XXVIII, 88).
From January 1753 the General-Principia was entrusted to the
keeping of the generals as a most holy document. Frederick attached
personal letters to the recipients, warning them not to leave the book
lying about, 'or even to read it in the presence of servants - your own
or anybody else's. When you want to read it, make sure you are alone.
As soon as you are finished, you must seal it up again and lock it away
somewhere safe' (to Major-General Schmettau, 2 December 1754,
quoted in Preuss, 1832-4, I, 238).
The great secret was preserved until 20 February 1760, when a
copy was captured in the possession of Major-General Czettritz at
Cossdorf. By the end of 1762 a variety of editions had been published
in Leipzig, Frankfurt and London, and as far afield as Spain and
Portugal. The loss of security was regrettable, but the world admired
the design and purpose which, as they could now see, informed
Frederick's conduct of war. In the Austrian camp, Field-Marshal
Daun found himself in hearty agreement with almost everything that
Frederick had written, though Article XXIII confirmed his belief that
he has often done battle without good reason. To my way of think-
ing, you should give battle only when the advantages of a victory are
greater in proportion than the harm that will be the consequences of a
retreat, or of the loss of the battle' (Kriegsarchiv, Vienna, Kriegswis-
senschaftliche Memoires, 1760, II, 27). The Prince de Ligne simply
called the work the best book on warfare that he knew.
Since 1748 the Prussian generals had already been in possession of
two more narrowly focused directives - the Instruction fur die Major-