amid corruption scandals, but also the Parti Qué-
bécois, led by René Lévesque, seemed poised to lead
the province to semi-independence. Bourassa was
thought to be politically finished, but the Parti Qué-
bécois lost the referendum on sovereignty in May,
1980, Lévesque retired, and Bourassa, after biding
his time in academic positions abroad, returned to
leadership of the Liberal Party in 1983. In 1985, the
Liberals won a majority in the National Assembly, de-
feating the Parti Québécois by a margin of more
than 15 percent of the popular vote, capturing 99 of
the assembly’s 122 seats, and returning Bourassa to
the premiership.
Bourassa’s second term was a boom time for Que-
bec economically, with retail sales and natural re-
sources doing particularly well. His particular proj-
ect, selling hydroelectric power from James Bay in
the north of the province to American consumers
frustrated by high energy costs, had mixed success in
the era of seemingly renewed energy availability.
The James Bay project and its enivronmental effects
angered the indigenous Cree people who lived in
the area. Bourassa helped Quebec join the global
economy, achieving what commentators François
Benoit and Philippe Chauveau called “l’acceptation
globale,” or global acceptance. The cerebral, austere
Bourassa, known for his “passionless politics,” proved
surprisingly popular, despite lacking the charisma of
some of his predecessors. He fit the mood of the
pragmatic, business-minded Quebec of the 1980’s.
Bourassa’s party easily won reelection in 1989 by an
even more impressive margin than they had enjoyed
four years previously.
Problems arose when renewed constitutional ne-
gotiations commenced in the late 1980’s with the
goal of normalizing the still-unresolved relationship
between Quebec and the rest of Canada. Bourassa,
although a staunch anti-secessionist, was enough of
a Québécois patriot to insist on recognition of the
idea of Quebec as a “distinct society.” Anglophone
Canadians looked upon even this recognition as an
infringement of the Canadian constitution’s Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms (passed as part of the
Canada Act, 1982). This feeling was intensified by
Bourassa’s moderate but nonetheless decided ef-
forts to make the French language the exclusive ve-
hicle of communication in Quebec.
Impact Bourassa’s premiership ended in a series of
largely unsuccessful negotiations with his fellow pro-
vincial premiers over the proposed Meech Lake con-
stitutional accord. Despite personal goodwill on the
part of Bourassa, he refused to compromise on what
he saw as good for his province simply to achieve a
resolution. The battle over recognition for Quebec
cost Bourassa and the Liberals their popularity, and
the Parti Québécois regained control of the Na-
tional Assembly less than a year after Bourassa’s res-
ignation as premier.
Nicholas Birns
Further Reading
Bourassa, Robert.Power from the North. Scarborough,
Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1985.
Lisée, Jean-François.The Trickster: Robert Bourassa
and Quebecers. Toronto: Lorimer, 1994.
MacDonald, L. Ian.From Bourassa to Bourassa: Wilder-
ness to Restoration. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Uni-
versity Press, 2002.
See also Quebec English sign ban; Quebec refer-
endum of 1980; Lévesque, René; Meech Lake Ac-
cord.
Bowers v. Hardwick
Identification Supreme Court decision
Date Decided on July 30, 1986
The constitutionality of a Georgia law outlawing sodomy
was upheld, slowing the progress of gay rights by allowing
states to prosecute gay male sexual behavior as a felony. The
decision was one of many that sought to define the limits of
an implicit constitutional right to privacy.
Michael Hardwick was a gay man in Atlanta, Geor-
gia, who was targeted by a police officer for harass-
ment. In 1982, an unknowing houseguest let the of-
ficer into Hardwick’s home. The officer went to the
bedroom, where Hardwick was engaged in oral sex
with his partner. The men were arrested on the
charge of sodomy. Charges were later dropped, but
Hardwick brought the case forward with the pur-
pose of having the sodomy law declared unconstitu-
tional.
Hardwick claimed that Georgia’s sodomy law vio-
lated a constitutional right to privacy that was im-
plicit in the Ninth Amendment and the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Previous decisions, notablyGriswold v.
The Eighties in America Bowers v. Hardwick 131