to New York City as “Hymietown.” Because the cor-
nerstone of Jackson’s campaign was tolerance for di-
versity—advocated by his organization, the Rain-
bow Coalition—his perceived anti-Semitism seemed
to represent the height of hypocrisy, and it cost
him votes he could otherwise have won from the
party’s more progressive members. Moreover, the
Democratic National Convention in San Francisco
adopted a set of procedural rules that Jackson be-
lieved stacked the deck in Mondale’s favor, eliminat-
ing what little chance he had of winning new dele-
gates on the convention floor.
Hart, by contrast, proved a tenacious opponent
for Mondale, because he was able to identify himself
as representing a new, centrist movement within the
party. He claimed that his ability to resist conven-
tional leftist wisdom would strengthen the Demo-
crats’ ability to win the votes of moderates who had
deserted them in 1980 to elect Reagan. Hart af-
fected the Kennedy style and appearance and, in-
deed, presented himself as an updated version of
John F. Kennedy, the youngest person to be elected
president. However, the Mondale campaign was able
to project an image of greater stability and substance
in its candidate’s program, and he rallied in the later
primaries. At the Democratic National Convention,
Mondale prevailed over Hart with 2,191 delegates to
the latter’s 1,200. Jackson retained his 485 Southern
delegates, but could win no more.
Mondale’s choice of a vice presidential running
mate was a calculated gamble. Conventional politi-
cal wisdom dictated that it should be someone who
commanded a significant regional constituency that
Mondale lacked, such as Colorado’s Hart, respected
Texas senator Lloyd Bentsen, or Governor Michael
Dukakis of Massachusetts. Mondale, however, deter-
mined upon a more daring course of action: He con-
sidered running mates who could deliver a different
kind of constituency based on their race, gender, or
ethnicity, as well as sending a message of change, di-
versity, and inclusiveness that would appeal to a
broad range of voters throughout the nation. Con-
tenders for the vice presidential nomination there-
fore included Henry Cisneros, Hispanic mayor of
San Antonio, Texas; San Francisco mayor Dianne
Feinstein; Representative Geraldine Ferraro of New
York; and Los Angeles’s African American mayor,
Tom Bradley. (Jackson seems never to have been
considered.) Win or lose, Mondale believed, his
choice would set a historical precedent and score a
major coup against the Republicans, who were be-
ginning to be criticized as the party of old white
men.
Mondale ultimately chose Ferraro, who became
the first female nominee for vice president of a ma-
jor political party in the United States. She delivered
an effective acceptance speech, and the public-
opinion polls indicated a surge in support for the
Democratic candidates in the wake of their conven-
tion. The Mondale-Ferraro ticket polled at 48 per-
cent, while Reagan and Bush were supported by 46
percent of the voters polled.Debates and Disaster The slight advantage en-
joyed by the Democrats shortly began to unravel.
Mondale’s attempt at candor—admitting that he
intended to raise taxes while at the same time accus-
ing the Republicans of hypocrisy on this issue—
backfired, and the polls quickly turned against him.
Mondale and Ferraro were almost immediately
placed on the defensive by a persistent, negative at-
tack campaign orchestrated by Republican political
operative Lee Atwater. A rumor, which allegedly
originated with Atwater, linked the Ferraro family toThe Eighties in America Elections in the United States, 1984 327
1984 U.S. Presidential Election ResultsPresidential
CandidateVice Presidential
CandidatePolitical
PartyPopular
Vote% of
Popular VoteElectoral
Vote% of
Electoral Vote
Ronald Reagan George H. W. Bush Republican 54,455,472 58.77 525 97.58
Walter Mondale Geraldine Ferraro Democratic 37,577,352 40.56 13 2.42
Other 620,409 0.67 0 0Source: Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.