guerrillas. In Reagan’s second term in office, sophis-
ticated but relatively inexpensive U.S. surface-to-air
missiles known as Stingers allowed the Afghani resis-
tance to neutralize Soviet control of the air. Over the
years until the final Soviet withdrawal from Afghani-
stan in February, 1989, these policies grew increas-
ingly popular in the U.S. Congress, until support for
secret appropriations to fund the project became
nearly unanimous. Especially instrumental in build-
ing bipartisan support for the mujahideen was Dem-
ocratic congressman Charles Wilson of Texas.
The Reagan Doctrine President Reagan’s policy of
confronting aggression by the Soviet Union and So-
viet allies came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine.
With the exception of Afghanistan, however, nearly
all its other applications were controversial in Con-
gress. Inspired by the 1979Commentar ymagazine es-
say “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” written
by his future U.N. ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick,
Reagan embraced a vision of the United States once
again leading a free world. However, Reagan firmly
believed that it was specifically communist
tyranny that posed a threat to the nation.
Therefore, while he opposed left-wing dic-
tatorships, he consistently supported right-
wing dictatorships, especially in Central
America. Because the Reagan Doctrine
advocated military and economic aid be-
ing given to any allies who were under
attack, it advocated preserving tyrannies
when those tyrannies were anticommunist.
The administration also sought to aid anti-
communist guerrilla armies that sought to
dislodge new revolutionary anti-American
governments. Fearing repetition of the fi-
asco of the Vietnam War, however, Con-
gress was reluctant to embrace this policy
formula.
In 1981, after Cuban and Soviet assis-
tance to revolutionary Nicaragua became
clear, communist insurgencies against
neighboring governments also increased.
Some of these U.S. allies who came under
communist attack, such as Guatemala and
El Salvador, violated the human rights of
their own citizens. The Guatemalan and
Salvadoran governments tortured and
murdered civilians who opposed them.
Congress insisted that for aid to these anti-
communist states to be given at all, they would have
to make progress toward eliminating their death
squads and protecting the human rights of their
citizens. Moreover, Congress wanted these Central
American regimes to be replaced over time by demo-
cratic institutions. Reagan reluctantly agreed to these
conditions.
Even with this concession, Congress was willing to
send direct military aid only to El Salvador. In 1984,
that nation held democratic elections, and reformist
José Napoleón Duarte became president. As a result,
congressional purse strings loosened, and El Salva-
dor received significant U.S. aid. Within five more
years, the country’s communist insurgency was de-
feated both militarily and at the ballot box.
Persuasion by the Reagan team was less successful
when Congress was asked to fund the anticommu-
nist group known as the Contras, whose guerrilla
activities aimed at removal of the recognized gov-
ernment of Nicaragua, led by leftist Daniel Ortega
and the Sandinista National Liberation Front. Many
members of the Contras had been connected to the388 Foreign policy of the United States The Eighties in America
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, left, stands by as President Ronald Rea-
gan addresses a crowd during a White House Rose Garden ceremony in 1983.
The two men were the guiding force behind U.S. foreign policy during much of
the 1980’s.(AP/Wide World Photos)