price. The Chevrolet and the Datsun then drove
away.
After observing the activity in the parking lot
from his station on the roof of building 131, Staff
Sergeant Alfredo Guerrero became concerned and
immediately began an evacuation of the building.
Guerrero’s vigilance was the only source of warning
the occupants of the building had, and his actions
were credited with saving many lives. He was later
awarded the Airman’s Medal.
At approximately 9:50p.m., the truck exploded
with a blast felt as far as the Persian Gulf state of Bah-
rain, some twenty miles away. It killed nineteen
Americans and one Saudi. Almost four hundred
people of various nationalities were wounded. The
blast devastated building 131 and left a crater in the
parking lot eighty-five feet wide and thirty-five feet
deep. Six other buildings in the complex were
heavily damaged or destroyed, and windows were
shattered as much as a mile away.
Intelligence Failures and Suspects In Washington,
President Bill Clinton vowed that those responsible
would not go unpunished. Secretary of Defense Wil-
liam Perry immediately appointed retired general
Wayne A. Downing to do a quick review of the facts.
The House National Security Committee had a fact-
finding team in Saudi Arabia within two weeks. Fol-
lowing their respective investigations, the House re-
port cited intelligence failures, while the Downing re-
port declared that those responsible for force
protection had failed to do their jobs satisfactorily. Ac-
cording to the Downing report, intelligence had pro-
vided sufficient warning of the terrorist threat to U.S.
forces in Saudi Arabia, and there had been both op-
portunity and motivation to reduce vulnerabilities.
The perpetrators were alleged to be thirteen
members of the Saudi Hezbollah (party of God)
and one unidentified member of the Lebanese
Hezbollah. The Saudi Hezbollah members included
the leader of the organization and the head of their
military wing. The Saudi group was alleged to have
acted, at least in part, on behalf of unnamed Iranian
government officials who were said to have sup-
ported and directed their activities. The unidenti-
fied Lebanese Hezbollah member was said to be the
supplier of the explosives that the Saudis were be-
lieved to have smuggled into the country by car. In-
vestigators said the bombing was part of a campaign
begun by the Saudi Hezbollah in 1993 with the aim
of driving the United States from the Persian Gulf.
Immediately after the bombing, all but two of the
thirteen Saudis left the country using fake passports.
One of those fleeing, Hani Al-Sayegh, was arrested
in 1997 in Canada, where he denied any involve-
ment in the bombing. He was later removed to the
United States based on a promise to cooperate. He
promptly broke that promise and in October, 1999,
he was deported to Saudi Arabia to face charges con-
nected to the bombing.
By the end of the 1990’s, none of the perpetrators
had been brought to trial, and the investigations had
still produced insufficient evidence for any indict-
ments. Improvements in relations between Saudi
Arabia and Iran had made investigation of the latter
country’s involvement more difficult. In June, 2001,
fourteen men were indicted for the bombing. No
Iranian officials were named in the indictment.
Impact Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen,
who succeeded Perry in January, 1997, held the
commander of the 4,404th Wing, Brigadier General
Terryl J. Schwalier, responsible for failure to ade-
quately protect his forces. For that reason, Cohen
denied his promotion to major general, even
though the promotion had already been an-
nounced. In disagreement with Cohen’s decision to
deny the promotion, the Air Force chief of staff,
General Ronald R. Fogleman, retired before the end
of his tour of duty.
As a result of the Khobar attack, the Air Force de-
veloped its antiterrorism course, increased standoff
distances, and improved communication. Compre-
hensive protection for military members or “force
protection” is now an overriding concern in every
operational military mission. Since the bombing,
force protection often dictates where personnel live,
how they behave on and off duty, and even how their
mission is performed.
Iran angrily rejected U.S. allegations that ele-
ments of the Iranian government were involved in
the bombing, and the incident significantly height-
ened tensions between the two countries. The
bombing itself emphasized the growing threat to
U.S. and Western interests from radical Islam.
Further Reading
Copeland, Thomas.Fool Me Twice: Intelligence Failure
and Mass Casualty Terrorism.Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff, 2007. Evaluation of intelligence failures
in terrorist incidents. Examines five case studies,The Nineties in America Khobar Towers bombing 483