the ‘inside’ other 117
center to the periphery. Thus the space in a way ‘closes’ (and, there-
fore, becoming ‘owned’) the community.^121 This does not imply only
making it own in a physical sense (in terms of certain localities and
landschaft zones), but also for understanding and giving certain values
to that space.^122
It is obvious therefore that in Uighur inscriptions the Other was
understood mainly as enemy who had to be subdued.^123 Indirectly the
inscriptions set out the idea that the khagan was master of the four
world directions and he had to impose peace and calm over them so
everyone who stood against him was considered an enemy. With the
exception of the Chinese, at least as far as the information in the Tur-
kic Orkhon inscriptions was concerned, none of all the other enemies
was described in a pejorative manner (cf. the explicit depiction of Chi-
nese as cunning, sly, manipulative) and this fact is extremely impor-
tant having in mind the fact that other enemies were also tribes from
the ‘Steppe Empire’, as the Turks themselves.
The Turks (especially in the time of the Second Khaganate) and the
Uighurs considered the Otüken (Khangai) Mountain as their sacred
center, the core of their lands.^124 It was the incarnation of the ancient
Turk idea of Fatherland as sacred place where the residences of the
khagans were situated and where the Turks from the Eastern khagan-
ate could get powers in time of hardship.^125 The sacred Otüken Moun-
tain was considered a spirit protector of the khagan clan; the cave of
the predecessor was also situated there and namely there the khagan
used to make special sacrifices once a year.^126
(^121) Traditsionnoe mirovozzrenie 1988, 25.
(^122) Traditsionnoe mirovozzrenie 1988, 29.
(^123) For these inscriptions see, Klyashtorny 1982, 335–366; Tekin 1982, 43–68;
Klyashtorny 1985, 137–156; Tekin 1988, 111–118; Kliashtornyi 1987, 19–37. 124
The words of Kül-tegin are quite characteristic—establishing a polity in the
Chugay region is dangerous since it is a border territory and is quite close to China.
That is why Kül-tegin said to the Turks they should build their independent and eter-
nal ‘el/il’, e.g. their state, in Otüken. For this see, Stebleva 1965, 108–109. Here, what
we see is one example of that policy and those doctrines among the Turks, which Th.
Barfield inventively termed China’s “inner and outer frontier strategy”, connecting
them to the balance keeping between approaching to and/or living at a distance from
the China’s frontiers, i.e. to the frightening Otherness of China; in his view, only the
strict balance towards the Middle Kingdom could guarantee long lasting existence and
successes of the Turkic khaganates. 125
Borgoiakov 1974, 208–211.
(^126) Details see in, Kliashtornyi 2001, 81–89.