22 chapter one
mid-seventh century, and for the western Turks it was fi rst the Sas-
sanians and later—the Arabs, especially aft er 704 A.D.
Yurii Lotman accepts that the periphery, i.e. the borderlands, is the
place of the most intensive exchange and changes in the semiosis and
in the dialogue, in particular, thus causing, as a consequence, serious
transformations in the core/center.^29 In our case, that concept is valid
mainly for the Western Turks, but also sometimes for the Uighurs (see
the acceptance of the Manichaeism by the Uighur khagan in 762/763
A.D., during his stay in the Chinese capital).^30 Consider also that the
Turks in the time when the Turkic state did not exist (from the 630s till
the 680s) and a great number of the Turkic aristocracy were sinicized
as a result of the fact^31 that the Turks were settled down in Northern
China and in Ordos and were given Chinese titles, positions, etc.
Th e destiny of the Turks who lost their independence in the mid-
seventh century and submitted to China is indicative enough. Taking
into consideration that the typical Turkic mentality and governing
style was based on charismatic leadership and not on citizenship (as
it is in China), the T’ang dynasty (618–907) admitted along its north-
ern borders (and what is more important—to the south of the Wall)
various Turkic tribal formations. Th ey were supposed to be a buff er
between China and the rest of the other “northern barbarians”; and
this was not unlike the Byzantine concept of the foedus/foederati. Th e
Turkic Orkhon inscriptions (the ones of Tonyuquq, Kül-tegin, and
Bilge khagan) represent evidence that certain Chinese titles and ritu-
als were adopted by the Turkic aristocracy as a result of these changes
uniformly considered as disastrous for the Turkic nature.^32 It is not
likely that any essential changes occurred in these borderlands since
the Turks continued to live there the way they always had and were
governed by their own rulers (although they were now obedient to the
Chinese); they avoided living in the towns, i.e. the most important—
from a symbolic point of view—places of the Chinese civilization.
Th erefore, the question of the real sinicization of the Turks and their
acceptance of the Chinese otherness in the 630s/680s is still open to
(^29) Lotman 1992, 21.
(^30) Christian 1998, 267; Mackerras 1990, 329–330.
(^31) See Rybatzki 1997; Kliashtornyi 1992, 330–334.
(^32) See Kliashtornyi 1964; Stebleva 1976; Malov 1959; Rybatzki 1997; Kliashtornyi
1992, 330–334.