58 chapter one
the typical features of its “strategic culture” manifested by a “strategic
behavior”. Johnston says that the essence lies in the following: to rely,
both in theory and in practice, on strategic defense (fortresses, defen-
sive walls, garrisons, etc.) always supplemented by diplomatic intrigues
and forming alliances instead of expensive military campaigns carried
out on the territories of the nomads, or their total annihilation.^165 Th e
only aim of the dynasties of real Chinese origin was to prevent the
establishment of a great nomadic confederation to the north. Prob-
ably this strategy was closely related to one of the main Chinese prin-
ciples—“the soft defeats the hard”. Of course, the Chinese who were
known for their fl exibility did not follow this principle dogmatically.
Th e Byzantines also used diplomatic intrigues all the time and there
are too many examples to be cited here in detail.^166
Th e relations between the Khazars and the Byzantines as well as
between the Uighurs and the Chinese were a bit diff erent since they
had been allies for many decades: the former against the Arabs^167 and
the latter—against the rebel An Lu-shan and the dangerous enemy
Tibet.^168 Th is fact probably soft ened the extremes in the notions of the
Other as it was the necessary factor in political, military as well as eco-
nomic spheres. Th ere were even marriages at the highest level between
these royal courts and they were used to consolidate their strategic
relations in the period between the 760’s and the 840’s.
Despite all these epithet-images (“sly”, “perfi dious”, “dishonest”,
etc.) neither the Bulgars, nor the Khazars or the Turks and the Uighurs
aimed for the total annihilation of the sedentary Other living to their
south. Of course they did not have the resources to maintain domina-
tion over these territories, but it was also true that they needed the
sedentarists as Others, in order to confi rm their own political positions
and (especially) their own identity. Th is is proved by the recorded situ-
the manipulation of the Kutrigurs and Utigurs. For another examples, but this time
coming from T’ang China, see, Bichurin 1950, 254 (s.a. 628). 165
Jonston 1995, 25. According to Jonston, as regards the other characteristics, the
Chinese preferred two strategies: 1) limited war, or 2) exercising limited power, but
only if there was a clear and defi nite goal. Also see, Maliavkin 1980, 103–126.
(^166) For some of the essential aspects of Byzantine diplomacy see, Shepard and
Franklin (eds) 1992.
(^167) Noonan 1992, 109–132.
(^168) See Beckwith 1993 (4th ed.); Maliavkin 1992; Pulleyblank 1955; Mackerras 1968
[2nd ed. 1972]; Sinor 1998, 192, 196.