156 CHAPTER 3
and 913)28 that are known from Eastern sources, coincide with the Khazars’
military actions against Derbent (in 901, 909 or 912, in alliance with the Sarirs
and the Shandans).29
It can be concluded that despite the joint efforts of the Rus’, Khazars and
the Samanids, the Caspian-Caucasian trade connection with the Muslim
East remained closed during the tenth century. The only alternative was the
road that led east of the Volga towards the Samanid state. Even if the Khazars
would have wanted to cut off the access of the Rus’ to the Caspian Sea, they
would have had no incentive to do so, since they were isolated from the new
Muslim states, located south of the Caucasus and along the Southern Caspian
coast. The Rus’ campaigns in the Caspian Sea indeed indicate the existence of
common interests despite the accession of the Severians and the Radimichi
by Oleg. L. Gumilev could therefore be quite right in assuming that Oleg and
Khazaria may have had an agreement that divided their spheres of influence
in Eastern Europe.30
According to T. Noonan, the new route did not isolate Khazaria from inter-
national trade. It led both to Itil and to Bolgar. The Middle Asian trade with
Khazaria and Eastern Europe was “a response to the disturbances in the Azov
steppe which resulted from the Pecheneg migration”.31 The transformation
of Volga Bulgaria into a large trade center was of significant importance. Rus’
merchants began to travel more often to Bolgar than to Itil. T. Noonan also
accepts the possibility that Khazaria may have been avoided by land caravans
travelling between the Samanid state and Volga Bulgaria, and intentionally so,
since it was more convenient for them to reach Itil. In his opinion, the adop-
tion of Islam indicates a disrespect to Khazar authority, while the Bulgar state
28 According to Novosel’tsev 1990, 212–213, there was only one campaign. His opinion is
shared by Romashov 2005, 107–110. Artamonov 1962, 370 and Pletneva 1976, 66 believe
that the campaigns were three.
29 The last campaign of the Rus’ in the Caspian Sea, prior to their victory over Khazaria,
was in 943, before the Deilemites captured Baghdad (in 945). Perhaps the author of the
Cambridge Document was referring to this campaign in particular; after which the Rus’
were subjected to Khazar authority (lastly, see Romashov 2005, 110–119). Dunlop 1967, 241
accepts the possibility that in 943 the Khazars blocked the road along the Volga for the
Rus’ military (hence, not commercial) fleet.
30 Gumilev 1997, 215. V. Petrukhin accepts the possibility of a thaw in the Rus’-Khazar rela-
tions in the early tenth century, reflected in the Rus’ campaigns in the Caspian Sea.
Ultimately, the flow of silver coins through the Caucasus and Khazaria was not reinstated.
Khazaria’s blockade of Kievan Rus’ coincides with the entry of the latter in the Khazar
sphere of influence—i.e. in the 940s. (Petrukhin 1995a, 93–94 and 1993, 72–77).
31 Noonan 1985, 202.