the disintegration of the empire 93
Byzantium policy.142 the khan was also geographically better placed than
the sultan to help reconquer Byzantine territory: without mongol con-
sent, if not their active assistance, michael viii would have been unable
to reconquer the cities of the Western Black sea coast from the Bulgarians
in 1262 or 1263, mesembria, anchialos, sozopol and ahtopol,143 and would
have even less been able to reimpose his authority on the islands of the
lower danube,144 which were under immediate golden horde control.145
in the same vein, we must mention Berke and Baybars’ plan to restore
the exiled sultan ‛izz al-dīn Kaikāwuz to his father’s throne in Konya; had
it succeeded, this would have been no less advantageous to the Byzan-
tines, since it would have protected their possessions in asia minor from
foreseeable persian attack.146 the scheme was hatched as part of a far
more ambitious anti-ilkhanid project. to reinthrone ‛izz al-dīn, who had
risen against hülegü, would mean to deprive the ilkhanate of control over
the seljukid sultanate, and bring anatolia into the front which the sultan
and the khan had assembled. such a political reorientation would have
reversed the positions of the warring states, with profound implications
for the commerce in which they engaged: not only would the straits be
entirely removed from hülegü’s sphere of influence, but the ilkhanate’s
access to the Black sea and to the mediterranean would also come under
control of the sarai-cairo axis—with incalculable consequences. the
Jochids and mamluks aimed at a seljuk restoration, which would have
had no chance of success except as part of a general offensive against the
ilkhanate. this, however, was postponed.
By contrast, it was much more pressing for the allies to engage the ser-
vices of a maritime power which could ensure their commercial and dip-
lomatic links. the only power which could fully satisfy these needs was
the genoese, who had many qualities in their favor. in the first instance,
the ligurian republic had the capacity to transport enough slaves from the
golden horde to the insatiable markets of alexandria.147
142 avenarius, “nikaia,” p. 43.
143 pachymeres/Bekker, i, pp. 210–211, Brătianu, Vicina, p. 53, ostrogorsky, Geschichte,
p. 375, todorova, “Black sea,” pp. 229 ff., ciocîltan, “geneza,” p. 92.
144 manuel holobolos/FHDR, iii, pp. 444–455; cf. laurent, “domination,” pp. 189 ff.,
Brătianu, “roumains,” pp. 199–203.
145 in 1253, rubruck considered that the mongols ruled usque ad Danubium (Wyngaert,
Sinica Franciscana, i, p. 167, rubruck/Jackson, pp. 65–66).
146 the failure of this scheme would soon bring a further setback; under pressure from
hülegü, the basileus was obliged to close the link between sarai and cairo.
147 cf. manfroni, Storia; on the weakness of the mamluk fleet, cf. ayalon, “mamluks;”
the golden horde never had any maritime capacity.