98 chapter three
between the two neighboring ulus, or whether—as in so many similar
situations—the changing needs of commerce proved more powerful than
deep-seated enmity.163
in any case, even if most of the time the golden horde maintained
their link to azerbaijan via the derbent pass, this side-route to the silk
road could hardly replace direct participation in and overlordship of the
great asiatic axis. it proved equally unworkable to try to share in the prof-
its of the great transcaucasian trade links by investing capital “extrater-
ritorially,” as Berke’s initiative to finance a weaving venture in tabriz was
to show.164
Unlike this unconventional enterprise, the response that in fact saved
the situation was drawn directly from the classic repertoire of measures
that show once again the etymology of the word rival: one who takes water
from the same river, and argues over its use.165 to make good the losses
suffered in the cuman steppe after the blockade, the solution chosen was
simply to divert some of the silk road traffic into golden horde territory.
the old Urgench-sarai-soldaia road was upgraded to a major trade artery,
which could hold its own against the original asiatic route in terms of
security, ease of transport and an attractive customs regime.
“the situation was most comparable to that at the end of the sixth cen-
tury, when the Byzantine empire attempted to import chinese silk by the
turkish northern route, while the sassanids of persia attempted to con-
trol the silk trade themselves.”166
163 on the state of this trade route from the perspective of travelling merchants
in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see the scant information summarised in
chapters 4.1.3, 4.2.
164 see above, p. 65 note 22.
165 valpy, Dictionary, p. 407, citing Ulpian: Si inter ‘rivales,ʼ i. e. qui per eundem ‘rivemʼ
aquam ducunt, sit contentio de aquae usu.
166 this is p. pelliot’s assessment, adopted whole-heartedly by Brătianu, who concluded
that “thus, the same interests determine the same outcome, even at several centuries’ dis-
tance” (Brătianu, Mer Noire, p. 214; cf. also Brătianu, Les Vénitiens, p. 13); unfortunately,
although it is key to understanding the golden horde’s unrivalled contribution to Black
sea trade, the french historian’s observation was not used to illuminate the unique
economic situation in the region during the chinggisid era; see more explicitly, though
without reference to other epochs, heyd, Histoire, i, pp. 2, 6, 9, 12, on the emperor Jus-
tinian’s attempts to win the monopoly on asian trade especially in silk, and the persian
response, and vailhé, “projet,” pp. 206–214, on similar attempts by his nephew Justin, who
in 568 concluded a commercial treaty with the turkish khan of the eurasian steppes and
transoxiana along with an offensive-defensive treaty against persia; the ottomans in the
sixteenth century chose the same tactic, this time against the safavids (cf. Bennigsen,
lemercier-Quelquejay, “horde,” passim, and İnalcık, “Question,” p. 87).