the golden horde and the black sea 149
It should be noted that these diplomatic and military efforts had a pow-
erful commercial dimension. further, Berke also pioneered the construc-
tive approach to the loss of tabriz, attempting to develop an east-West
trade route of his own to compensate.20 hence the generosity which he
showed to the polo brothers when they came from constantinople seek-
ing to increase their capital, and hence also, in particular, his permission
for them to travel back to the West, probably with his aid and support,
even if this was not their original purpose.21 all of this was in anticipation
of the caravans of Genoese and Venetian merchants who would take the
same road across Golden horde territories to central asia and china in
the first half of the following century.22
as part of these large-scale changes, the fate of the Black Sea also under-
went a change. from having been a subject of secondary importance at
best for the Golden horde during the first two decades of their existence,
it now became an absolute priority for the Jochids, thanks to the storm of
events unleashed in 1261. the specific causes for this radical transforma-
tion of the Black Sea’s significance are most properly sought in the geo-
political reconstruction of the whole expanse of lands controlled directly
or indirectly by the Mongols. this reordering, which had far-reaching
commercial implications, came about as a result of the fragmentation of
chinggis Khan’s empire.
hülegü’s fundamental strategic plan was to isolate the Golden horde
completely: this was the guiding principle for all of his diplomatic, mili-
tary and commercial initiatives, once the rivalry with Berke intensified.
this gave rise to a blockade of impressive dimensions, stretching from
central asia through persia and asia Minor as far as the Straits.23
the khan on the Volga tried in vain to reopen the Golden horde’s two
main arteries, the caucasian route through Derbent and the Black Sea Sol-
daia-Sinope axis.24 his only success was in breaking the blockade on the
Straits by military means, attacking Byzantium in the winter of 1264/5.25
Neither his defeats nor his victory were simple manifestations of a given,
temporary configuration of forces, but rather—as later events were to
20 See chapter 3.4.1.
21 Ibid., p. 100.
22 See chapter 3.4.1.
23 See below, pp. 243 ff.
24 See chapter 3.1 and canard, “un traité,” p. 211.
25 See below, pp. 243 ff.
