the golden horde and the black sea 159
swerve from this line.67 their determination here was doubtless highly
profitable as well, but is to some extent admirable in itself, since we can
easily imagine that both Mongol trading partners exerted constant pres-
sure on the Genoese, each in the hope of tipping the balance of trade in
its own favour. the Venetians too were eager to exploit the situation in
the Black Sea in order to gain a foothold in this aspect of Levantine com-
merce, and sought to undermine Genoa’s position.
caffa also had an extremely important strategic role, since together
with pera it formed the axis upon which Genoese naval power in the
Black Sea was based in the later thirteenth century. It was thanks to this
power that the Ligurians were able to lay down the law in the Black Sea,
despite Venetian wishes and, when necessary, defying even Byzantium.68
aside from any other considerations, Genoese political neutrality in the
Black Sea was dictated by the enduring ambition to control all the major
trade routes around its shores. Seen in these terms, the route between
the two Mongol states was one of the most active, since complementary
wares and goods were exchanged on the caffa-trebizond route. In this
case at least, economic interests overrode political tensions.69
the new impetus in Black Sea trade after 1285, driven mostly by the
Genoese, was still some way from achieving the full commercial poten-
tial which it would unfold in the following century, and suffered setbacks
despite promising beginnings. Its initial vigour was sapped by two almost
simultaneous wars: a war on land between the Mongols of toqta and of
Noghai, and at sea between the Genoese and the Venetians. caffa was
directly caught up in both conflicts.
after the Sicilian Vespers of 1282, Venice had given up hope of being able
to retake constantinople by force and thus became more accommodating,
67 Despite received opinion; Brătianu, Recherches, p. 261, Spuler, Mongolen, p. 75, Ber-
indei, Veinstein, “tana-azaq,” p. 116; Soranzo, Papato, p. 324 note 2, observes the same
neutrality in the Genoese (and aragonese) approach to the Ilkhanid-Mamluk conflict,
where the Ligurian merchants managed to maintain commercial relations with both pow-
ers after 1290.
68 cf. Gregoras/Schopen, II, pp. 876–877, papacostea, “Gênes,” pp. 228, 231 note 73.
69 this route largely came to replace Soldaia-Sinope (see above, pp. 142 ff.), except in
the matter of the slave trade which was redirected via the Straits; the caffa-trebizond
trade is heavily attested in the notary documents from 1289–1290 of Sambuceto/Balard;
in the following century, ‛umarī/Quatremère, p. 380, recorded that merchants were con-
stantly travelling from one shore to the other (cf. Zachariadou, “trebizond,” p. 353). a
similar episode is recorded for the parallel caucasian route; the persian chronicler Mirk-
hond noted that “while the border at Derbent was closed, abaqa allowed only merchant
caravans to pass” (Spuler, Mongolen, p. 358).