180 chapter four
the treaty did not exist because it was in neither party’s interest to
have an official written record, the contents of which might incriminate
either one of them: the risk that the agreement may cease to be confiden-
tial led the partners to refrain from writing it down at all.
understandably enough, papal pressure against the “bad christians”
who traded with the infidel was fiercely directed against Genoa, and deter-
mined the republic’s course in choosing to forego negotiations with egypt
at the level of state, instead encouraging their citizens as much as they
could to keep their dealings with the Mamluk Sultan “under the table,” be
these diplomatic or commercial: the same pressure shaped their conduct
toward the ulus of Jochi.
on the other hand, the state’s extreme adaptability to all kinds of exter-
nal conditions when its citizens’ interests so demanded gave free rein to
private initiatives, which made the very most of local conditions wher-
ever they could take gain a foothold. the republic showed itself capa-
ble of astonishing shifts and transformations, and even of disappearing
entirely, as in the case under discussion. this was a Genoese speciality
par excellence 145 and made best possible use of the ambiguity inherent
in any verbal agreement, so that an initial concession could evolve in a
new de facto status at the opportune moment without being unnecessarily
encumbered by clauses and precise details.146
It would have been equally inconvenient for the Volga khan to have
his pact with the Genoese publically known, since the agreement was
essentially “unconstitutional.” Özbek was a ruler well aware of the ching-
gisid ideals of world conquest, and his mission was thus to increase the
territory of his ulus, by no means to diminish it.147 thus in 1313 he would
in the Golden horde (original agreement, p. 203 note 248), trebizond (p. 118 note 254) and
in the Ilkhanate (p. 124 note 285).
145 While Genoa excelled, as it were, by virtue of its own weakness as a state, its
rival Venice drew strength from the diametrically opposed virtue of étatisme (cf. Lopez,
“Venise”).
146 among other striking examples of this method of growth is the parallel develop-
ment of the two main Genoese colonies in the Black Sea, pera and caffa: both used the
same politics of the fait accompli, inching toward its goal, patiently and tenaciously (cf.
Brătianu, Recherches, pp. 88, 91, 93, 97, Balard, Romanie, I, pp. 113–114, 179 ff., papacostea,
“tana,” passim).
147 for medieval Mongol ideology, see Kotwicz, “Mongols,” Voegelin, “orders,” turan,
“Ideal;” on this basis, Özbek declared to the foreign merchants that the rulers of the West
ought to submit to him and that they ruled malo titulo (Winterthur/Baethgen, p. 162,
ciocîltan, “restauraţia,” p. 588 note 7). those who heard his threats believed that by the
end of his rule, he would have both the means and the will to remedy this state of affairs
(Sanudo/Kunstmann, p. 779, Laurent, “assaut,” passim).