the golden horde and the black sea 181
have had to give his formal consent to a concession which went against
his principal mission: he would have flagrantly breached one of the basic
principles of governance by granting what amounted to a territorial con-
cession. as well as all its other advantages, a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ here
also saved the appearances.
Özbek thus showed the Genoese generosity above and beyond what
was allowed to a ruler of chinggis Khan’s blood. his motive, as may eas-
ily be imagined, was the project of relaunching the Mamluk alliance,
which could not be revived without the help of a marine power. the khan
intended to bring what he could to the table in reviving the coalition with
the sultan and keeping it running smoothly, whether by political, com-
mercial or religious means, and as part of this, he used what means were
available to him to set up and protect a naval via magna between his
lands and egypt. the conditions of Genoese return to caffa are incontro-
vertible proof that Özbek did not shrink from any sacrifice, not even an
infringement of his ‘constitution’, to make caffa a strong bridgehead, as
quickly as possible, for a project in which Sarai once again had a great
deal invested.
the “favours” which the khan showed to the Genoese in 1313 formed a
lasting foundation on which the merchants built their hegemonic position
in the Northern Black Sea. Subsequent assaults from land or by sea could
not dislodge them from the position, until the end of their history in the
region in 1475. the concession which they gained was partly capitalised
upon straight away, and partly in the following decades.
When Özbek granted the Genoese the right to resettle caffa, it can
hardly have escaped his attention that the town’s defensive capacity had
been amply proven over several months in 1307/8, against the Mongol
army. this veritable milestone in the art of resisting a siege is all the more
striking not just because of the vast disparity in numbers between besieg-
ers and besieged, but because of the town’s rudimentary defences, which
consisted only of a ditch and an earthen rampart, probably topped with
a palisade.148
Seen from this perspective, Özbek’s action is shown to have been unusu-
ally serious: the chronicler’s simple and straightforward phrase noting the
event also incontestably identifies the khan as morally and politically
148 Gregoras/Schopen, II, p. 684, Brătianu, Recherches, pp. 219–220, Balard, Romanie, I,
pp. 99–100.