the golden horde and the black sea 191
Judging by the victims chosen, it seems self-evident that Özbek’s repri-
sals were intended to begin the job of liquidating the whole Genoese-
Mamluk network. In the end, they did no such thing: the first fit of rage
soon subsided, after the emir and the merchant had fallen victim, and the
shift in Jochid foreign policy that it seemed to announce went no further
than this stormy beginning.
the khan’s own sense of the realities of the situation forced him to
temper his reaction drastically. first and foremost, he did not have the
necessary means to change any of the underlying factors.
While princess tulunbek was a card who could be played only once, the
export of slaves was, at least in principle, a constant factor which could
be used to bend the Sultan in cairo to Sarais’ will. unfortunately for the
khan, this leverage no longer worked. the Sultan’s declaration that he no
longer needed these wares from the steppe was no mere bravado, a provo-
cation in response to Sarai’s threats, but an actual statement of fact: once
the conflict with the Ilkhanate had ceased, and a peace duly concluded in
1323,197 this freed egypt from the very costly need to replenish the ranks
of its army constantly when soldiers fell in the war against persia.
the first sign that Özbek had decided, despite all appearances, to restore
relations with the Sultan dates again from 1322/3, when he disclaimed any
responsibility for Segurano Salvaigo’s execution to the egyptian envoys,
who were otherwise treated with all the coolness Özbek could muster to
salvage his prestige. he told them that the Genoese merchant, who had
worked under the aegis of the Mamluk sultan, had been killed by “a king
of the islands.”198
the first embassy which the khan sent after he had got over the initial
shock is very revealing here: it reached cairo in 1324, bringing a reproach
from the khan for refusal to join the war against abū Sa‛īd and his regent
197 Ibn Duqmāq/tiesenhausen, Sbornik, I, p. 321, Mufaḍḍal/Blochet, II, pp. 73 ff., 119, Weil,
Geschichte, Spuler, Horde, p. 94, and idem, Mongolen, p. 103, Labib, Handelsgeschichte, p. 71;
Schmid, Beziehungen, p. 247, correctly calls this “der eigentliche friede,” after earlier efforts
in the fourteenth century; the great egyptian merchant abu ’l-Majd al-Sallāmī played his
own part in bringing about the agreement (Labib, “Marchands,” p. 210). Before the treaty
was concluded, Özbek had unleashed his grand diplomatic offensive aimed at drawing
the Mamluks into the war waged in the spring of 1319, and al-Malik al-Nāṣir made his
choice and communicated it to abū Sa‛īd: “[Özbek] wished us to send an army from egypt
to aid him against you, but I refused” (al-‛aynī/tiesenhausen, Sbornik, I, p. 491, Zakirov,
Otnosheniya, p. 83).
198 al-‛aynī/tiesenhausen, Sbornik, I, p. 493, Kedar, “Segurano,” p. 91; the ‘king’ is impos-
sible to identify.