192 chapter four
choban, but at the same time bringing the customary gifts.199 Sultan al-
Malik an-Nāṣir received Özbek’s envoys with the usual shows of goodwill
and in 1324/5 sent a friendship mission in response as though nothing had
happened.
the failure of all attempts to win Sultan al-Malik an-Nāṣir’s support had
crucial implications, with multiple and profound effects: the Jochid state
lost a goal which had stimulated all its energies for a decade, channelling
them towards a precise end, and as a result its foreign policy lost vigour
and coherence, in a manner strongly reminiscent of what had happened
during the final years of toqta’s reign. the consequences of this second
eclipse were much more lasting, some of them indeed were decisive.200
Without this driving project, the political aspect of Jochid-Mamluk rela-
tions understandably soon lost its vigour and dwindled into little more
than an exercise in diplomatic protocol, without content. compared with
the frequent contacts of the period immediately preceding, the rarity with
which embassies were exchanged after 1325 is telling in itself: the same
arab sources which recorded the prior diplomatic activity reveal that the
Jochid and Mamluk courts sent envoys, in one direction or the other, in
1328/9, 1332, 1334/5, 1337, 1338 and 1340/1.201
199 al-Nuwayrī/tiesenhausen, Sbornik, I, p. 149, al-‛aynī/ibid., p. 495, Zakirov, Otnosh-
eniya, p. 86.
200 the immediate effects of the egyptian ‘defection’ were felt on the caucasus front.
Özbek’s campaign, launched in 1319, which had staked its success on Mamluk intervention,
took a turn very much for the worse after the peace concluded between Sultan al-Malik
al-Nāṣir and abū Sa‛īd in 1323. In a surprising twist in the long history of the wars between
these two Mongol states, choban, the Ilkhanid regent, began a counteroffensive in 1324/5
once his rearguard at the euphrates was secure, marched through the caucasus valleys
as far as the river terek and took many prisoners (Spuler, Horde, p. 95, and idem, Mon-
golen, p. 104). following this humiliation, Özbek needed ten years to recover to the point
where he dared once again to try his luck against the persian enemy, this time alone. on
this occasion also he made few gains, but profited from the sudden death of abū Sa‛īd in
November 1335, creating extremely favourable conditions for the foray since the Ilkhan’s
death also marked the extinction of his dynasty. a succession crisis was unleashed which
was irreversible, and in the end fatal to the state, drastically diminishing its capability to
defend itself (al-‛aynī/tiesenhausen, Sbornik, I, p. 497, the ‘history of Sheikh uwais’, ibid.,
II, pp. 229–230, Spuler, Horde, p. 94, and idem, Mongolen, p. 107). With his political horizon
to the South blocked off, Özbek sought compensatory initiatives after 1325 to the North
and West (Spuler, Horde, p. 97, Schmid, Beziehungen, p. 248). While his actions in russia
had long-lasting effects (Spuler, Horde, p. 97), the final outcome of his Western initiatives
was nothing but a long, weary and confused failure (cf. Laurent, “assaut,” who discusses
only the Byzantine project but whose conclusions may be generalised; cf. Spuler, Horde,
pp. 97–98).
201 cf. Zakirov, Otnosheniya, pp. 86–90; more briefly, Spuler, Horde, p. 96.