10 chapter one
dramatically by the devastations of the invasion era and the savage extrac-
tion of wealth which followed, was a harsh reality with severe repercus-
sions for the balance between income and expenses.25 In this regard, it
was an additional disadvantage that by the nature of things, most taxes
were raised in kind and in produce.26 the khans, however, needed pre-
cisely movable wealth and precious goods—and they never had enough
of exactly these.
a convincing number of sources show that in the most authentic ‘bar-
barian’ tradition, the chinggisid rulers preferred these forms of concen-
trated wealth as payment.27 alongside lesser expenses that devoured their
budget, their army was top-heavy when compared to the available eco-
nomic base and was the principal, and always insatiable, consumer of this
wealth.28 Whether we are discussing the unitary empire at the height of
its strength29 or the fragments that were left when the empire was carved
up,30 an inherent weakness was always gnawing inexorably away at the
state’s strength: the khans’ revenues did not keep pace with the expenses
which their position as rulers obliged them to meet. this discrepancy was
at the root of several crises which led the state to the brink of collapse.31
25 Spuler, Mongolen, p. 248: “cingiz hans und hülägüs Züge hatten der finanziellen
Kraft der von den Mongolen eroberten Länder ebensoschwere Wunden zugefügt wie zahl-
reichen anderen Bereichen des öffentlichen Lebens. So war das Ilchan-reich von vornher-
ein in geldlicher hinsicht infolge des Mangels an steuerzahlender Bevölkerung auf eine
ziemlich schwache Grundlage gestellt und ein wesentlicher teil der Bemühungen zur
Wiederbesiedlung und Urbarmachung des Landes kann nur dem Bestreben zugeschrieben
werden, diesem Übelstand abzuhelfen;” cf. petrushevsky, “condition,” pp. 483 ff. the mid-
fourteenth century Syrian scholar Ibn Faḍl allāh al-‛Umarī, a well-placed observer, reports
that the financial situation was even more precarious in the Golden horde: “the khan of
the Golden horde does not have an income as great, nor tax revenues, nor as many towns
and villages, as the ruler of the Mongol state in persia” (‛Umarī/Lech, p. 136).
26 allsen, Imperialism, pp. 144–188, Martinez, “Development,” pp. 100 ff.
27 the tradition also survived in the Ilkhanate, although here persian civilisation had
an enormous impact. thus the Ilkhan Ghazan appointed two chancellors to his exchequer,
“1. für seine Juwelen und seine Kleider und 2. für die Staatsgewänder, d. h. für Bestandteile
des Staatsschatzes” (Spuler, Mongolen, p. 248).
28 according to one contemporary report, even in the pastoral Golden horde, the khan
paid his ‘countless’ troops only in specie (‛Umarī/Lech, pp. 144, 147).
29 Batu, finding himself in a liquidity crisis, asked the great khan at Qara Qorum for
10,000 silver ingots so that he could buy pearls. even though Möngke owed him his throne
and the two had excellent relations, he sent Baku only 1,000 ingots and advised him to
practise moderation (allsen, Imperialism, p. 58).
30 For instance in the Golden horde, which reached the peak of its development under
khan Özbeg, about whom al-‛Umarī wrote: “he is friendly to his subjects and to all travel-
lers, but he does not give very generous gifts, for even if he wished to do so, the revenues
of his realm are insufficient” (‛Umarī/Lech, p. 137).
31 the introduction of paper banknotes in an attempt to redress the disastrous state of
the Ilkhanate’s finances is significant here; “nach der einführung der Scheine September/