208 chapter four
although the caffans advanced practical arguments to justify such
trade as necessary for their town’s survival, these very likely did less to
bring the Venetians round to the fait accompli than the offer to let them
trade there alongside the Genoese, especially since the Venetians had no
practical alternative.260
Janibek’s stubborn refusal to bargain with representatives of the two
Italian republics forced them to renegotiate their own treaty once the
original agreement expired. the compromise agreement was signed on
22nd June 1345, and concentrates—of course—on caffa. the Genoese
were pressured by the possibility of a separate Jochid peace with the
Venetians,261 which would certainly have allowed the latter to return to
tana: they thus offered them considerable concessions, to preserve both
caffa’s autonomy and its advantage over its rival on the Don, which threat-
ened to rise once more if the khan ever changed his mind. the Genoese
exempted the Venetians from all taxes and duties, and allowed them to
trade in their two holdings of caffa and pera, while other towns of the
Northern and Western coasts, whether directly held by the Golden horde
or tributary, were still subject to strictest devetum. to avoid any possible
ambiguity, tana is the only settlement explicitly mentioned as the target
of joint embargo.262
260 the Venetian envoys reported this offer to the doge, along with other news, in
December 1344: Excussacio quam isti domini habent, per quam ipsi permittunt facere mer-
caciones suos Ianuenses in isto mare, est quia ipsi dicunt quod si extringerent sua navigia et
suos mercatores, terra Gaffe non posset retinere et illud quod faciunt pro conservacione dicte
terre Gaffe faciunt, et quod ipsi essent contenti et placeret eis quod mercatores vestri venirent
in Gaffa ad faciendum mercaciones, sicut faciunt sui Ianuenses. [.. .]. Et si ipsi debent facere
mercacionem et gens vestra in toto esset exclussa non possendo mercacionem facere in isto
Imperio, nobis videtur maximum dapnum et detrimentum vestris civibus et fidelibus et honori
vestre dominacioni. [.. .] Et ideo nobis videtur quod esset mellius quod gens nostra posset hic
in Gaffa venire ad faciendum mercacionem, antequam ipsi faceret et gens vestra in toto esset
exclusa, et hoc quod acta non sit no volendo facere mercacionem (Morozzo della rocca,
“Notizie,” pp. 280–281).
261 the possibility was considered: the Venetian envoys wrote to the republic’s leaders
in January 1345 advising against such a step, since they suspected that any such offer from
Janibek could not be taken seriously and was merely a strategem whereby the khan hoped
to split the allies and finally take caffa. Venice had nothing to gain from the fall of the only
christian bridgehead to which, for good or ill, they had access and where they could trade
with the Mongols on their own terms (Morozzo della rocca, “Notizie,” pp. 283–284).
262 the text of the new Genoese-Venetian treaty is published in DVL, I, pp. 303–305,
and contains the following principal provisions: Nec [.. .] possit aliquis dictarum parcium
[.. .] facere [.. .] merces ad aliquas terras uel loca dicti imperatoris Ianibech [.. .] saluo ad
locum et ciuitatem Caffa, et ab inde infra uersus occidentem siue uersus Peyram, ipso loco
siue ipsa ciuitate de Caffa comprehensa. Ad que quidem loca de Caffa, et ab inde citra uersus
Peyriam et occidentem, liceat et licitum sit dictis partibus [.. .] mercari [.. .] Nec possit aliquis