the golden horde and the black sea 209
for all that the new treaty clearly shows the Genoese making sacrifices
in order to maintain the alliance, there is no doubt that the advantage was
overwhelmingly theirs: though the text does not explicitly mention caffan
autonomy, the Venetians recognised the fait accompli and also signed up
to protecting Genoese commerce from themselves as competitors. It is
surprising that the Venetians received not the least material recompense
in return for such significant political support: a citizen of the Serenis-
sima, drawing up a balance of the caffan episode, found that their stay
there actually led to losses,263 despite the conditions which the Genoese
had promised in the treaty of June 1345.
By rallying the Venetians to their doctrine of hegemony in the Northern
Black Sea, the Genoese not only made them acknowledge certain crucial
legal aspects but also gained a huge practical advantage which was a deci-
sive advantage for caffa’s defence in the critical years of the war with
the Jochids. although the Venetians took no active part in the Genoese
defence effort either by land or by sea, their neutrality indirectly made the
prolonged caffan resistance possible.264
Venetian non-intervention was particularly useful in Black Sea waters
since it left Genoese vessels free to supply two vital needs for the besieged
city: they could continue to bring in supplies and provisions, and protect
it from any attacks from the water.
Janibek understood the Genoese strategic advantage once his troops,
armed with siege engines, showed themselves powerless against caffa’s
walls, and he knew that the port city would never surrender as long as
its maritime links were intact. under the circumstances, the khan took a
decision which was unique in Golden horde history, decreeing that the
Jochid state, an eminently land-based power, was to have its own naval
force.
dictarum partium [.. .] ultra dictum locum siue dicatm ciuitatem de Caffa [.. .] versus ori-
entem sive Tanam ire; the treaty was valid until March 1346, during which time Venetians
coming to caffa would be liberi et immunes in dicta ciuitate ab omnibus drictibus, cabellis,
introytibus, comercijs, seu exactionibus, que in ipso loco colliguntur; ita et taliter, quod an
nullum drictum uel comercium soluendum ipsi Veneti uel eorum merces conpelly [.. .] pos-
sint; cf. commentaries at heyd, Histoire, II, pp. 196–197, papacostea, “tana,” pp. 207–208.
263 the chronicler Lorenzo de Monacis was unambiguous in summing up the situa-
tion: Tunc coeptum est negotiari a Venetis in Gaffa, fere usque ad annum MCCCL suo utique
incommodo, at ingenti Jannuensium emolumento (Monacis/cornelius, p. 207; cf. Lopez, Sto-
ria, p. 332, papacostea, “tana,” p. 208).
264 a Venetian agent in caffa brought this to the doge’s attention in January 1345: Et
iusta, si dominacio vestra atabit se asque Genuensium cum Imperatore, Gaffa non poterit se
tinere, et est destruction Ianuensium (Morozzo della rocca, “Notizie,” p. 284).