the golden horde and the black sea 211
When the Genoese thus scoured the crimean coast of rival ships, they
not only confirmed once more their dominance in the Black Sea but also,
as a direct and very important consequence, opened a new chapter in
their colonial history in this part of the world. the naval expedition prob-
ably set sail from caffa in 1345, or the next year at the latest, and as well
as destroying Jochid shipping, they carried out an action which was pro-
foundly innovative in Genoese Black Sea policy, occupying cembalo, the
economic and strategic keystone of the peninsula’s Western coast.268
Scholars agree that the operation was intended only to safeguard caffa,
and as a strike against the Jochids, yet it fits seamlessly into a string of
other, similar initiatives whereby the Genoese wrested a number of other
possessions on the Northern Black Sea coast from the Golden horde in
the following years, either by force of arms or by treaty.269
taken together, these acquisitions reveal a perfectly planned scheme
with a precise goal: the preservation of caffa’s autonomy and its function
as the dominant commercial centre in the Northern Black Sea. annexation
of these territories into a hinterland satisfied caffa’s need for grain and
food, and also created a true physical barrier between the horde and the
Venetians, since holdings such as Balaklava were strategic points. hereto-
fore the Genoese had never been able to impose themselves as exclusive
middlemen even in favourable circumstances, but now they came to con-
trol the vital flashpoints. When the Genoese took cembalo it thus served
as a touchstone for dividing two historic stages, and two different ways to
pursue one goal: caffan domination in the region, at any price.
understandably, the Genoese naval victory of 1345 or 1346 also had a
direct effect on the course of the war. Janibek had staked victory on a
Jochid fleet, and now knew that caffa could not be taken or quashed.
the khan clearly took this discovery to heart, since there were no further
large-scale military operations as there had been in the first half of the
decade: caffan sources reveal instead that the Mongols were playing a
to reconcile the khan with the christians but rather to ally the turks in asia Minor with the
Golden horde against the Genoese and the Venetians (ibid., pp. 277, 279).
268 today Balaklava; the caffans described the settlement to Doge Giovanni de Murta
at a difficult moment in the interlude of 1347–1350: Ac eciam Tartari multum sperant in cas-
tro Cimbali, quia si castrum ipsum haberent, possemus dicere amisisse mare et fore obsessos
omnium victualium et refrescamentorum; ex quo dictum locum multum opportet habere opti-
mum et suficientem custodem in dicto castro (petti Balbi, “caffa,” p. 226, papacostea, “tana,”
pp. 212–213); in 1345 Janibek had ordered the locals to withdraw from the coast to inland
crimea, leading to a shortage of provisions for caffa.
269 cf. for Soldaia Nystazopoulou-pélékidis, Venise, pp. 26–27, while for Gotia see chap-
ter 4.2.7.