the golden horde and the black sea 215
reopening trade so completely to the Genoese and to the Venetians
was tantamount to a wholesale restoration of Jochid Black Sea policy
from the second half of Özbek’s reign, and in both instances the policy
depended on playing the Venetian card against the Genoese. the differ-
ence between the two situations, similar though they are, is not obvious
at first sight but is crucial: while the old khan was strong enough as a ruler
to keep the Venetian-Genoese rivalry in check, his son was a lesser man,
and had already clashed with the Genoese to no good end, thus losing that
advantage—which had grave results for the rest of his reign in Sarai.
Janibek concluded separate peaces with the Genoese and the Vene-
tians in 1347, allowing the latter back to tana, and must have known that
he was thus restoring the ‘normal’ context for the rivalry of these two
commercial republics.280 the result of this manoeuvre fell far short of all
expectation: the war between the Italian powers was transferred from
land to sea, and between 1350 and 1355 it in turn paralysed all commercial
activity in the Black Sea, then in the peace treaty that followed the parties
agreed to boycott tana for three years.281 even if this last clause was won
at great cost282 and was only valid for three years, it marks a new victory
in the Genoese policy of maintaining caffa’s autonomy and primacy in the
region—a state of affairs which was a thorn in the flesh for both Jochids
and Venetians.283
5% of the total value of goods; cf. heyd, Histoire, II, pp. 197–198, Skržinskaja, Storia, p. 11,
Vernadsky, Mongols, p. 204, papacostea, “tana,” pp. 208–210.
280 In a report of January 1345, Venetian envoys draw the doge’s attention to the khan’s
ulterior motives: Et nos credimus quod in fine unionis quam vestra dominacio habet cum
communi Ianue, si vestra dicta dominacio voluerit tratare concordium per se sola cum Imper-
atore, quod ipse Imperator se vobiscum attabit, et bene vidimus quod istum concordium est
multum necessarium pro vestra civitate Veneciarum. Sed nos vidimus ista contraria, quod iste
dominus est perfidus Sarracenus et multum desiderat ponere vos in brigam cum Ianuensibus,
et nobis non videtur quod illud quod vobis promitteret ipse faceret nisi ut posset venire ad
suam intencionem de Gaffa (Morozzo della rocca, “Notizie,” pp. 283–284).
281 LJRG, II, col. 620; the absence of a Venetian consul in tana in 1350–1358 leads Nysta-
zopoulou-pélékidis, Venise, p. 48, to speak of “relations interrompues;” cf. heyd, Histoire, II,
p. 200, Skržinskaja, Storia, p, 12, papacostea, “tana,” p. 213, ciocîltan, “Bazele,” pp. 102 ff.
282 cf. the instructions of 26th May 1351 to the republic’s representatives that they were
to levy duties from their colonists in Romania, particularly those in pera, but also those
in chios, cyprus, trebizond, cembalo, akkerman and Vicina, pro guerra Caffe, an order
which the Genoese government explains with quia, ut scitis, inter alia que nobis ad guerram
necessaria sunt, principaliter est moneta (Belgrano, “Documenti,” pp. 241–251).
283 the gap between Venice’s hopes for the war (the destruction of caffa) and the out-
come (a boycott of tana in which they participated) may be seen in the Doge’s letter to
aragon, his ally, in 1352: Habemus etiam quod Januenses de Caffa sunt ad pessimam condi-
cionem et scripserunt illis de Pera quod nisi in brevi subveniantur non poterunt se tenere,
quantum imperator Tartarorum et gentes eius contra eos sunt graviter iniuriati et intendunt