The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the 13th and 14th Centuries

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218 chapter four

irreversible effects, they certainly marked a shift in the balance of power

against the Jochids.294

the most surprising aspect of the transcaucasian expedition, given

that the state of affairs in persia was so favourable to intervention and

had been since the beginning of Janibek’s reign in 1341, was how long it

took for Jochid troops to invade and how brief their resounding victory

was: tabriz was not occupied until 1356, and was only hold for a year and

some months.295

the reason for the campaign’s long delay must surely be sought in tar-

tar entanglement in clashes on the Golden horde’s Western frontier and

on the Northern Black Sea coast. It was only when these two fires had

been smothered, or rather banked down, that the khan was able to lead

his army to invade azerbaijan. It is instructive here to observe the politi-

cal and diplomatic preparations for the campaign of 1356.

Janibek probably reached an accord with his principal enemy on the

Western borders, casimir III of poland, by 1353,296 while by contrast con-

ditions did not favour a settlement on the Northern Black Sea coast which

might somehow eclipse caffa’s position until late 1355, after the end of

the Second War of the Straits and the subsequent peace, when the Vene-

tians were open to negotiations with the Jochids. the chronology of the

charter of 2nd March 1356, grafting a Venetian settlement alongside caffa

designed to neutralise the great Genoese trade centre for a while at least,

suggests that it was intended as a political step allowing the immediate

launch of the campaign in transcaucasia.

294 for battles fought on what would later be Moldavian territory, cf. Spinei, Moldova,
pp. 257–289, papacostea, “Geneza,” ciocîltan, “alanii.”
295 al-Malik al-ashraf was abandoned by most of his troops, captured and executed,
and the Golden horde annexed azerbaijan. Janibek left his son Berdibek in tabriz as gov-
ernor. he died unexpectedly in 1357 on his way back to Sarai, probably poisoned by his
heir, who succeeded to the throne (cf. Spuler, Horde, pp. 101–102, idem, Mongolen, pp. 114–
115, Grekov, Yakubovskiy, Orda, p. 265).
296 It was probably in 1353 that Janibek recognised the transfer of ruthenia, a Golden
horde vassal principality, to the polish crown, in return for a tribute payment; in any case,
by 1355–1356 Jochid-polish relations were as good as they could be, and steppeland cavalry
fought alongside casimir against the Lithuanians; in January 1357 pope Innocent VI felt
obliged to chide casimir for concluding fedus et ligam with the tartars (rhode, Ostgrenze,
pp. 186, 194–195, 197, Knoll, Rise, pp. 138, 140, 156–157, Spinei, Moldova, pp. 268–269). We
might remark here that the arrangement was not ideologically sound from the Golden
horde perspective either, since a chinggisid ruler could not bargain vassal territory away
but was supposed to defend it at all costs; Janibek’s deal thus offers further proof of the
deplorable state of Jochid military strength and finances under his reign.

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