preliminary remarks 29
of the problems to come in the following decades: in 1218 chinggis Khan
was impatient to send his horsemen into transoxiana to take Muḥammad II
Khwarezmshah by surprise, but was forced to postpone the campaign by
a year for lack of forage.94 a lesser number of cavalry was then sent out
under the command of the generals Jebe and Sübödei to pursue the enemy,95
indicating that the terrain in persia could not support the great numbers of
horses in the main army without considerable logistical groundwork. ching-
gis Khan responded to the situation by ordering wholesale destruction in
eastern persia to turn the region into continuous pastureland.96
this shortcoming considerably delayed the advance of Mongol power
in Western asia, but was partially redressed by one natural advantage, the
importance of which in chinggisid history is impossible to overemphasise:
this was the pastureland of azerbaijan and arran, fed by many rivers and
covered in grass all year round, forming a veritable oasis for all turanic
populations. It is no wonder that the turanic peoples with their rich herds
and flocks were always drawn to the transcaucasia. this nomad enclave
is geographically situated between the settled lands of the caucasus and
persia, and was predestined to exercise power throughout the region: the
chinggisid strategists appreciated its qualities early on.
occupying this bridgehead was already a priority in 1229, the first year of
the great khan Ögödei’s reign. It was probably due to the difficulties set out
above that the emir chormaghun was unable to fulfil his mission and take
transcaucasia until 1232.97 From that point onward however it would serve
as the base of Mongol power in the near and Middle east until the collapse
of the Ilkhanate in 1335.
the hungarian puszta (pannonia) historically played the same role in
the heart of europe, as the frontier of the great eurasian steppe. Unlike in
azerbaijan and arran, the Mongols were not able to take full advantage of
these qualities on the Danubian plain as their hun and Magyar precursors
had done, turning the region into a permanent settlement. there were vari-
ous reasons why the puszta was abandoned once and for all in the spring of
1242, among them the general loss of interest in the Western front among
94 In the same year, 1219, chinese chronicles recorded: “envoys from the Great Khan
were killed in Khwarezm. a great expedition was decided, and a plan was worked out,
but the enterprise had to be delayed for lack of fodder” (Krause, Čingis Han, p. 304; see
also chapter 2.1.1).
95 Spuler, Mongolen, pp. 23–25.
96 Grousset, Empire, pp. 304–305; the project failed, probably because of unfavourable
climatic conditions.
97 Ibid., pp. 324–328.