mongol expansion & eurasian commercial axes 39
that your authority is recognised in most countries in the world; thus i
consider it my duty to form friendly ties with Your highness, whom i love
as well as i love my favourite child. You must certainly know that i have
conquered china and the neighbouring turkish lands; likewise you know,
better than anybody else, that my domains furnish me with soldiers, and
with inexhaustible amounts of silver from my mines, and that here we
enjoy an abundance of all kinds of goods, and thus have no need to seek
them elsewhere. if you consider it just that we each assure unhindered
access to the other’s merchants, we would both gain from this, and both
would prosper by it.”8
the chronicler says nothing of how the shah reacted during the actual
audience, but describes credibly and in detail his disquiet over the follow-
ing nights. he called one of the leaders of his embassy, Maḥmūd Yalavach,
to himself, and asked him in some agitation about the Mongol ruler’s true
strength. it seems from the discussion that the Khwarezmshah wanted
to hear some encouraging words from his subject, rather than the actual
truth.9 the latter responded with appropriate blandishments, which not
only swept away the shah’s uncertainties but made him boast of his own
power to Maḥmūd. “You know the extent of my realm and you know how
numerous are my armies! how can it be then that this wretch calls me
his son?”10
Far from being an over-reaction, Muḥammad ii’s anger was a response
to the threat implied in chinggis Khan’s message: the word “son” in the
diplomatic language of the time means a vassal.11 the Mongol ruler thus
left no doubt as to his intention to impose his rule on the shah’s domin-
ions, as chinggisid imperial doctrine dictated.12 willing or not, the shah
set in motion the events that would lead to the Khan’s victory.
hesitant, as his deeds showed him to be, Muḥammad ii bowed to the
great Khan’s will and accepted the proposal. this amicable arrangement
8 nasawī/houdas, pp. 57–58; nasawī/Bunyatov, pp. 78–79.
9 it is still unresolved whether Maḥmūd Yalavach of Khwarezm, who a few years later
was to be the governor of china, had yet entered Mongol service at this point; on his career
see allsen, Imperialism, pp. 101–102, 104–107.
10 nasawī/houdas p. 58; nasawī/Bunyatov, p. 79.
11 cf. spuler, Mongolen, p. 19; Barthold, Turkestan, p. 397: “the effort made by chinggis-
Khan to enter into relations with the empire of the Khwarazm-shah is fully explained by
the commercial interests of his influential Muslim advisers: if his envoys, on their sover-
eign’s order, called the Khwarazm-shah ‘the son of chinggis-Khan,ʼ this could hardly have
been done with the intention of provoking Muḥammad, and even the latter did not put
this forward as a casus belli.”
12 see above, pp. 25–26.