58 chapter two
although the Mamluks fought only one detachment, rather than the
great Mongol army, the historical significance of the battle greatly out-
weighs its military significance at the time: in the autumn of 1260, the
balance between the two powers was definitively struck. the chinggisids
had poured out irresistibly for thousands of miles on their road from the
Far east to the shores of the Mediterranean, but a few paces from their
final destination, on the very threshold of syria and egypt, they reached
the limits of their expansion.
the result of this last wave of pan-Mongol expansion was thus only half
a victory, or half a defeat: iraq had been conquered, but egypt defended
its freedom. the same held true at the commercial level: the iraqi spice
route fell into Mongol hands, while the egyptian route remained a Mam-
luk possession.
2.2.2 The Ilkhanate—Chief Beneficiary of Western Asian Expansion
despite this final defeat, hülegü’s campaign marked a real gain on the
previous state of affairs: Mongol rule was consolidated in persia,101 which
acquired territory through the incorporation of iraq,102 and at the same
time their hegemony103 was consolidated in the caucasus,104 in seljuk
anatolia105 and in cilician armenia.106
Möngke’s death exacerbated the pre-existing and pressing question of
who would benefit most from this expansion, which had been carried out
jointly. the potential for conflict was fed at this point by, on the one hand,
the demise of the chief figure who embodied law and order in the empire,
and on the other hand by the recent immense increase in value of the
domain which had already been bitterly fought over in the past.
101 cf. spuler, Mongolen, pp. 282–293 (chapter ‘die gauverwaltung’).
102 which became, administratively speaking, a mere persian province (ibid.,
pp. 290–293).
103 the two principal duties of a vassal under chinggisid rule were, as usual, to pay
tribute and to take part in the suzerain’s military expeditions; the vassals were ordinarily
‘assisted’ by a Mongol governor, with a variable number of troops at his disposal (ibid.,
pp. 270–273).
104 that is to say in greater armenia and in georgia (ibid., pp. 272, 293–294).
105 considered an unreliable vassal—and not without cause—the sultan was kept
strictly in check by Mongol troops stationed on his territory (ibid., pp. 272, 294–296); cf.
also işiltan, Seltschukengeschichte, p. 44, chapman, Michel Paléologue, p. 147.
106 unlike their seljuk neighbours, the armenians made a voluntary act of submission
and showed themselves, in due course, to be the Mongols’ most faithful vassals (spuler,
Mongolen, pp. 40–41, 46, 58, 298).