64 chapter three
these actions clearly cut across the golden horde’s ambitions for hege-
mony in the muslim east, and upset the balance of power between sarai
and Qara Qorum in favour of the toluids.13 they may be understood as
purely military in character, and valid only for the duration of hostilities.
hülegü overturned the balance and unleashed a storm when he con-
voked the qurultai and required his high-ranking supporters, from various
ulus, to recognise him as the ruler of iran and of all the territories recently
conquered in the joint campaign.14 the Jochid princes who formed part of
the imperial army at the time resisted all pressure he brought on them and
did not vote to legitimate this usurpation, an action which was revenged
in the typical mongol manner.15
not even the yarlïk granted by Qubilai as emperor could legitimate his
brother’s actions in claiming the shahs’ throne:16 beginning with Berke,
the khans of the golden horde stubbornly refused to recognise the ilkhans
as legitimate rulers, and also refused to acknowledge the emperors as a
source of authority, after the move from mongolia to china.17 chinggis
Khan’s empire was divided in the east as well, along the same line that
had always divided the nomads from the settled peoples, and had ceased
to exist.18
there is no doubt that the ultimate goal for Berke and his heirs in the
dispute with their persian kinsmen was to destroy the persian state and
annexe its territory.19 even before the dispute took on the “classic” form
13 they also fed the suspicions of the Jochid chieftains, and it cannot be ruled out that
the triumph of Berke’s faction over those who wished for a toluid alliance was a reaction
to these losses.
14 cf. pp. 53–54.
15 those who were able to flee to egypt thus escaped summary execution, and where
well treated there; a few were able to return to the golden horde via the caucasian passes
before they could be captured (Jackson, “dissolution,” p. 232).
16 ibid., pp. 234–252.
17 rashīd al-dīn wished to legitimise the state that he served by any means available,
and argues that möngke gave his prior consent to the proclamation of the ilkhanate but
that the great Khan’s decision was ‘private’ and thus secret. to support this claim (not in
itself very helpful to his thesis), he felt the need to bring in an even weaker proof by argu-
ing that the emperor never publically ordered hülegü to return to the ancestral homelands
after he had completed his mission. Be all that as it may, it is clear that when möngke
died in 1259, his brother had not yet fully carried out whatever orders he had been given
in 1251 (cf. ibid., p. 234).
18 ibid., pp. 227–230, compares the two processes and their mutual development.
19 the khan explained in a letter to the sultan of cairo during one of several attempts
to coordinate actions against the ilkhanate that he planned to annexe land as far as the
euphrates (cf. p. 91 note 137).