the disintegration of the empire 71
took the defeat to heart and set out to prove that it was a mere bump in
the road: he was quick to return to syria, where he reoccupied aleppo,
but his forces were once again defeated in the battle at homs in decem-
ber, and withdrew eastward across the euphrates.46 hülegü’s forces were
exhausted by the war with the Jochids that followed,47 and until the end
of his life he was never again able to confront the powerful sultan al-malik
al-Ẓāhir Baybars on the battlefield.48
the first years of the reign of hülegü’s son abaqa were similarly over-
stretched, since Berke invaded the ilkhanate in 1265 in an attempt to
take advantage of the difficulties that always attend the beginning of a
reign.49 hardly had this incursion been checked than abaqa was obliged
to send his forces east, where the chaghataids invaded in 1267. it took all
of abaqa’s attention to drive off the invaders from Khorasan, and occu-
pied him until 1270.50
the mamluk sultan made good use of the decade’s delay that his per-
sian enemy granted him. first of all, Baybars’ troops besieged the cru-
sader fortress at antioch and laid waste to its environs in 1262, and in the
following year the muslim army arrived at the walls of acre.^ the attacks
intensified once the mamluk sultan learned of the crusader alliance with
the mongols.51 caesarea was conquered in 1265 and razed to the ground,
while arsuf was occupied and fortified. acre’s outpost fortress at safad fol-
lowed in 1266, and became a watch post barring the way to the crusaders’
foothold on the mediterranean shore.52
Knowing that the overlords of cilician armenia were busy fighting
Jochid invaders, in 1266 the mamluks launched an expedition against
46 maqrīzī/Quatremère, i/1, pp. 131 ff., abu ’l-fidā’ (spuler, Mongolen, p. 55), Khowaiter,
Baybars, p. 53, amitai-preiss, Mongols, pp. 106 ff.
47 cf. above, pp. 67–68.
48 the only successful campaign on this front led to the occupation of the great com-
mercial centre of Upper mesopotamia, mosul (rashīd al-dīn/Quatremère, pp. 380–388,
maqrīzī/Quatremère, i/1, pp. 180–181, spuler, Mongolen, pp. 56–57, Khowaiter, Baybars,
p. 53); the siege of al-Bīra [= Birecik] on syria’s eastern frontier at crusader instigation in
winter 1264/5 was a failure, since the sultan relieved this vitally important strategic point
and then refortified it to such an extent that it became even more of a thorn in the side of
ilkhanid efforts in syria (Khowaiter, Baybars, pp. 54–55).
49 cf. above, pp. 67–68.
50 spuler, Mongolen, pp. 61–63.
51 Khowaiter, Baybars, pp. 80–82.
52 ibid., pp. 83, 87–92; this drastic measure was systematically applied to deprive the
crusaders of any ports which could supply them with reinforcements from the West; a
different fate was reserved for the fortresses of the interior, which were transformed into
mamluk bases (p. 86).