84 chapter three
consequently, by the end of winter 1289/90 at the latest, the Baghdad-
aden project had become a crucial matter in genoese-mamluk relations.
cairo could only view the action as an attempt to revive the tripoli opera-
tion. all that had changed was the theatre of action, rather than the aim:
having failed to cut the sultan’s sea routes in the mediterranean, a new
attempt was now made in the indian ocean. indeed the mamluk state
was perhaps more seriously threatened in the spring of 1290 than it had
been the previous year, since unlike tripoli, the iraqi bases from which
the genoese had chosen to assert their naval superiority were beyond the
mamluk army’s exclusively land-based reach.108
What the sultan could probably not have won by armed force, he
achieved by diplomatic means.
ibn abd al-Ẓāhir is certainly not exaggerating when he claims that
the genoese ambassadors “implored” the mamluk sultan to make peace:
quite apart from the sombre outlook, the merchants of the republic must
have suffered catastrophic losses during the few months when they were
unable to weigh anchor in egypt or syria. the high-placed chronicler
also records that the mamluk exchequer had suffered in turn when trade
with the genoese broke off, and that the sultan was finally persuaded to
lend an ear to the grievances of the republic’s emissaries in order not to
affect the prosperity of his ports, and the large sums of money which his
customs officers collected there.109^ Under these considerations, the treaty
was signed on 13th may 1290.110
the negotiations were no doubt long and exhaustive, but our author
(who noted the circumstances under which the treaty was drawn up) was
ideally placed as head of the chancery to know every twist and turn. nev-
ertheless, he passed over in silence the most fundamental military and
an army of unpaid informants for the sultan, target of the attack, who also had his own
paid spies.
108 describing the situation in 1332, adam/Kohler, pp. 552–553, recommends that the
pope use the genoese—for whom he had no great love—as the only ones capable of
carrying out crusading naval actions in the indian ocean: [.. .] meo judicio, nunquam per
aliquos alios quam per Januenses posset hoc negocium adimpleri. Et hoc vel quia in mari cete-
ris gentibus probiores et magis exercitati existunt, vel quia, ad circumeundum et videndum
ceteras mundi partes, facilius se exponunt; nec retrahit eos amor proprie patrie, nec retardat,
vel eciam quia magis avidi sunt ad lucrum. Jam enim Januenses soli naves faciunt in mari
predicto Indie, non tamen causa hic posita, sed spe lucri.
109 holt, “treaty,” p. 101.
110 for the latin translation, see Belgrano, “trattato,” pp. 167–175, and for an english
version of the preamble togther with ibn ‛abd al-Ẓāhir’s notes from the time, see holt,
“treaty,” pp. 105–108.