The Pursuit of Power. Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000

The Business of War in Europe, 1000–1600 95

arms races, when from time to time a new technology seemed capable

of conferring significant advantage in war upon its possessor.

In other parts of the earth, however, the Italian riposte to cannon

fire was not forthcoming. Instead, the edge that mobile siege cannon

gave to their possessors allowed a series of relatively vast gunpowder

empires to come into existence across much of Asia and all of eastern

Europe. The Portuguese and Spanish overseas empires of the six­

teenth century belong to this class, for they were defended (and in the

Portuguese case created) by ship-borne artillery, which differed from

that of land-based powers mainly in being more mobile. Ming China

(1368–1644) depended less upon cannon that did such upstart em­

pires as the Mughal in India (founded 1526), the Muscovite in Russia

(founded 1480), and the Ottoman (after 1453) in eastern Europe and

the Levant. The Safavid empire in Iran depended less on gunpowder

weaponry than did its neighbors, though under Shah Abbas (1587—

1629) the centralizing effect of the new technology of war manifested

itself there too. Similarly, in Japan the establishment of a single central

authority after 1590 was facilitated by the way small arms and even a

small number of cannon made older forms of fighting and fortification

at least partially obsolete.

The extent of the Mughal, Muscovite, and Ottoman empires was

defined in practice by the mobility of their respective imperial gun

parks. In Russia, the Muscovites prevailed wherever navigable rivers

made it possible to bring heavy guns to bear against existing fortifica­

tions. In the interior of India, where water transportation was unavail­

able, imperial consolidation remained precarious, since it required

A European Army of the Sixteenth Century in Marching Order
This bird’s-eye view (following page) shows how the European art of war combined
different arms and formations in the sixteenth century. Cavalry, light and heavy
artillery, pikemen, and arquebus-carrying infantry are accompanied by supply
wagons that could double as emergency field fortification around the encamped army’s
perimeter. Flags projecting above the array of pikes signified subordinate units of
command, which allowed maneuver on the battlefield. This is an idealized portrait;
in practice guns could seldom keep up with marching troops, and ground was almost
never flat enough to permit an army to move forward in such a broad-front forma­
tion.
Leonhardt Fronsperger, Von Wagenburgs und die Veldlager (Frankfurt am Main, 1573; facsimile
reproduction, Stuttgart, Verlag Wilh. C. Rübsamen, 1968).