The Pursuit of Power. Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000

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(^102) Chapter Three
manifest in the first decades of the seventeenth century. In effect, the
roar of Dutch and English naval guns closed off the last avenue of
escape from the economic and ecological impasse confronting
Mediterranean populations, so skillfully explored for us by Fernand
Braudel.^30
The Market Asserts Control
An important feature of European sea power in the sixteenth century
was its quasi-private character. In England, for instance, the Royal
Navy was only beginning to differentiate itself from the merchant
marine; indeed, most of the ships that exchanged shots with the
Spaniards in 1588 were merchantmen whose ordinary pursuits
smacked almost as much of raid as of trade. The same was true of the
Armada itself, which numbered forty armed merchantmen and only
twenty-eight specialized warships.^31
Dutch, English, and French merchantmen had the advantages and
disadvantages of an interloper when they ventured into the exclusive
preserves claimed by the Spanish and Portuguese governments. They
could try legal trade in any port of Europe, or go outside the law by
raiding the Spanish Main, dabbling in the slave trade, or smuggling on
some other coast, depending on what seemed most advantageous to
the captain and owners. Year after year suitably armed vessels could
expect to pay their way by returning to their home port with a mix of
booty and trade goods, varying with the opportunities the ship en­
countered in the course of its voyage.
It was a dangerous business, no doubt, in which command of supe­
rior force at the moment of contact often made the difference be­
tween success and failure. Robbers always risked being robbed by
someone stronger; and ready resort to armed force involved danger to
life and limb analogous to what soldiers faced on land. The investors
back home, who made each voyage possible by buying shares with
which the costs of fitting out the ship and hiring the crew were met,
also faced high risks, since many ships never returned and others came
back with little to show for the effort expended. But against such
failures must be set the occasional spectacular windfall, like the for­
tune paid out by Sir Francis Drake after his first voyage around the
world (1577–80).^32



  1. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of
    Phillip II, 2 vols. (New York, 1972, 1973).

  2. Garret Mattingly, The Defeat of the Spanish Armada (London, 1959), pp. 215–16.

  3. Investors received a dividend of 4,700 percent, according to ibid., p. 87.

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