The Business of War in Europe, 1000—1600 107Thus financial limits hampered early modern European govern
ments and sporadically paralyzed their actions for brief periods of
time, without, however, effectively controlling day-by-day policy and
administration, especially when it came to military affairs. Military
administration proceeded convulsively—recklessly overreaching avail
able resources, then collapsing in whole or in part, only to resume the
process a few months or years later.
This was also well illustrated by the Dutch wars. In 1576, the so-
called Pacification of Ghent prescribed the withdrawal of all Spanish
soldiers from the Netherlands as part of the political-financial settle
ment Philip II had to make after his bankruptcy. Spanish forces, ac
cordingly, disappeared from the Netherlands for most of the year
1577; and war did not begin anew on a full scale until 1583, when
truce with the Turks and the successful annexation of Portugal
(1680–81) made Philip believe that he now had the resources to win
decisive victory in the north.^37
At the tactical unit level, however, army administration, from the
time of the Hundred Years War to the mid-seventeenth century,
closely resembled the pattern of maritime commerce. A captain, often
a man of local importance or military experience, was commissioned
by some higher authority to recruit a company of soldiers from a
loosely defined district. Such captains were semi-independent entre
preneurs, just like any other kind of government contractor. A newly
commissioned captain might, for example, receive a sum of money to
pay out to his recruits on enlistment; on the other hand he might have
to advance recruitment bonuses from his own pocket in hope of future
reimbursement. The captain was also responsible for making sure that
his soldiers secured appropriate arms and armor, either by individual
purchase or by buying items needed on his own account and distrib
uting them to his soldiers either as free issue or against future stop
pages of pay.
Maintenance costs were managed in the same way, with the differ
ence that governments commonly found it easier to withhold back pay
from soldiers who were already enlisted. Old soldiers responded, of
course, by living off the country in which they found themselves.
Sometimes their commanders organized pillage by assessing contri
butions upon anyone within reach. In extremity, when income from
even these irregular sources fell short, the soldiers mutinied. Mutinies
achieved a conventional definition in the Italian wars during the 1520s
- Cf. Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659
(Cambridge, 19^7 2), pp. 336–41.