(^130) Chapter Four
the maniples of the Roman legion. Battalions of 550 men, further
subdivided into companies and platoons, made convenient units for
drill, since a single voice could control the movements of all the men.
Primary personal ties, extending from commanding officer to newest
recruit, could also establish themselves among the members of units
of this size. They could move nimbly on a battlefield, acting indepen
dently yet in coordination with each other, since an unambiguous
chain of command extended from the general in charge of the battle to
the noncom in charge of each rank of each platoon. Commanders at
each level in the hierarchy, at least in principle, responded to orders
coming from above, transmitting them to appropriate subordinates
with whatever additional specification the situation might require.
In this way an army became an articulated organism with a central
nervous system that allowed sensitive and more or less intelligent
response to unforeseen circumstances. Every movement attained a
new level of exactitude and speed. The individual movements of sol
diers when firing and marching as well as the movements of battalions
across the battlefield could be controlled and predicted as never be
fore. A well-drilled unit, by making every motion count, could in
crease the amount of lead projected against an enemy per minute of
battle. The dexterity and resolution of individual infantrymen scarcely
mattered any more. Prowess and personal courage all but disappeared
beneath an armor-plated routine. Soldiering took on quite new di
mensions and the everyday reality of army life altered profoundly. Yet
troops drilled in the Maurician fashion automatically exhibited supe
rior effectiveness in battle. As this came to be recognized, the old
irregular and heroic patterns of military behavior withered and died,
even among the most recalcitrant officers and gentlemen.
Efficiency in battle was important, but less significant than the im
proved efficiency a well-drilled army also exhibited in garrison and
siege situations. Nearly all of a soldier’s time, after all, was spent in
anticipation of actual confrontation with an enemy. How to wait with
out becoming restless and unmanageable had always been a problem
for earlier armies. When marching cross-country the problem solved
itself. But when an army settled down in a single location, doing
nothing for days or months on end, morale and discipline were very
liable to break down. The fact that a few hours of daily drill were easy
to organize, obviously useful, and readily enforceable made garrison
discipline easy to maintain.^11
- On Maurice’s reforms, in addition to Halbweg’s previously cited work, see the
provocative remarks by M. D. Feld, “Middle Class Society and the Rise of Military