(^180) Chapter Vive
tional naval preponderance so that peace, when it came in 1783, se
cured American independence without overthrowing Britain’s naval
primacy.
Two factors continually hampered French naval efforts. One was the
way in which land operations took precedence in French strategic
planning. Against England, as earlier against Holland, the master
scheme was to mount an invasion by land forces. The navy was there
fore expected to escort the invading force either directly across the
Channel or to the coast of Ireland or Scotland rather than to act
independently and on its own. Repeatedly, invasion plans were pre
pared, only to break down because of difficulties of coordination. The
fact was that in the eighteenth century staff work and technology were
inadequate to sustain a successful landing on a defended coast, as the
failure of several British efforts to land troops on the French coast
amply demonstrated. But when overambitious plans for invasion of
England or Ireland aborted, French policy makers were almost driven
to conclude that money spent on the navy was a waste and should be
cut back drastically.^49 Such a policy was doubly tempting when
privateering constituted a cheap and popular alternative way of harass
ing enemy commerce at no cost to the government whatever.
The impulse abruptly to turn off naval expenditure was reinforced
by the second persistent weakness the French navy confronted: inade
quate finance. The collapse of John Law’s schemes in 1720 meant that
throughout the rest of the eighteenth century the French government
lacked a central bank and source of credit analogous to the Bank of
England. Costs for building, equipping, and manning warships were
very great. With only short-term credit from suppliers and contractors
to rely upon, any significant increase in naval expenditures, respond
ing to sudden changes in circumstances—repairs after a storm or bat
tle, commissioning ships from the reserve, moving a squadron from
Brest to Toulon or back again—immediately created severe financial
problems.
Command mobilization could only carry so far. Compelling sailors
to man naval vessels was feasible. Both France and Britain regularly
resorted to force to fill out naval ranks. Against victuallers and timber
merchants, however, compulsion was almost wholly ineffectual. Fail
ure to pay promptly raised prices and choked off supplies.^50 Early in
- Cf. Vauban’s memorandum of 1695 to Louis XIV: “... fitting out fleets has cost
enormous sums; and these expenses have been a complete loss.” Quoted from Symcox,
War, Diplomacy and Imperialism, p. 240. - Timber suppliers in the Baltic preferred the English to the French because French