The Pursuit of Power. Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000

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Impact of Political and Industrial Revolutions^187

this divergence; it developed as a result of hasty improvisation and
desperate actions in the face of overwhelming emergency.
Yet it is also the case that the market basis of British power, both
economic and military, reflected a bias apparent from Elizabethan
times or even earlier. As for the French, their revolutionary resort to
command mobilization was never complete, despite the rhetoric of


  1. The French revolutionary governments’ mix between compul­
    sion and reliance upon a more or less free market for mobilizing
    resources for state purposes was, in fact, a fairly faithful replica of
    similar mixes the royal governments of Louis XIV and earlier French
    kings had resorted to in time of foreign war and internal crisis. The
    British-French divergence unquestionably had geographic roots and
    reflected a recurrent difference between island and continental states
    that can be traced as far back as the second millennium B.C.^6 But in the
    late eighteenth century, the divergence became especially marked,
    presumably because of the new horizons of the possible that ac­
    cumulating skills and a growing population created for both countries.


The French Formula for Relieving
Population Pressure

The French revolutionary solution to an excess of manpower and a
deficiency of economically productive jobs did not emerge clearly
until 1794 and became firmly established only with the rise of Napo­
leon. Between the initial defiance of royal authority in June 1789,
when the National Assembly constituted itself from the Estates Gen­
eral, and the victorious advance of French armies into Belgium and the
Rhinelands in 1793–94, important changes came to the army and navy
inherited from the Old Regime.
The first such change was absolutely critical to the success of the
revolutionary cause, for it made the army unwilling to defend the Old
Regime against its assailants.^7 In ways largely untraceable, soldiers of



  1. The Minoan civilization of Crete appears to have concentrated resources at Knos­
    sos more by trade than by raid. Sea empires of Java and Sumatra did the same in the first
    millenium A.D. But islands divided among rival political masters, as Japan was through
    most of its history, characteristically conform to continental patterns of mobilization, in
    which command plays a more prominent part and the market remains subordinate.

  2. Use of regular troops against civilian crowds was an awkward matter for
    eighteenth-century armies. Cf. Tony Haytor, The Army and the Crowd in Mid-Georgian
    England (London, 19^7 8). A volley of muskets at close range was murderous; yet no
    other tactics were available. Crowd control was not systematically developed by Euro­
    pean police forces until the 1880s. The London dock strike (1889) established the
    principles of “Keep moving, please,” i.e., of allowing marches and peaceful demonstra-

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