206 Chapter Six
In relying on carts to supply his army, Napoleon was, in effect,
pitting them against water transport, for the tsar’s control of the river
and canal system of Russia meant that his forces could hope to benefit
from supplies of grain and other necessities delivered by barge and
riverboat in summer and by sleigh in winter. Since it was easy to move
even heavy cargoes up and down stream—for many miles if need
be—the Russians were in a position to supply their soldiers more
abundantly than was possible for the invaders, whose carts moved
lesser weights with much greater effort.^41
The British Variant
Before considering the consequences of Napoleon’s defeat in Russia,
it seems wise to shift attention across the channel and inquire briefly
how the British government managed its war effort against France in
the revolutionary years. No sudden breaks and no violent domestic
upheavals accompanied the mobilization of British resources for war,
though changes in British society were in the long run quite as revolu
tionary as anything that transpired in France, as our accustomed use of
the phrase “industrial revolution” attests.
The thesis that population growth was an important and perhaps the
principal factor upsetting older economic equilibriums in Great Brit
ain is a familiar one among historians who have tried to explain how
and why that island became the seat of the industrial revolution.^42 An
abundant labor force on the one hand and an expanding domestic
market on the other made economies of scale through use of newly
invented machinery feasible, whether it was a spinning mule for mak
ing cotton thread or a blast furnace for smelting iron. Cheap water
- At least in principle. I have not been able to find any discussion of how the
Russian troops were actually supplied in 1812; but an examination of the map shows
that the line of their retreat and advance crossed a series of river lines whose banks, on
either side of the route of march, were securely controlled by the Russian government.
I assume, therefore, that supplies came along the rivers; and even if deliveries were ill
organized, as is probable, they clearly surpassed French arrangements. The fact that the
Russian army remained in being and was able to harass the retreating Grande Armée
throughout the winter months stands as proof of this elementary fact.
- This was the central thesis of Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, British Economic
Growth, 1688–1959 (Cambridge, 1962) and, ten years later, W. A. Cole, "Eighteenth
Century Economic Growth Revisited,” Explorations in Economic History 10 (1973):
327–48, reaffirmed the idea. Cf. also H. J. Habakkuk, Population Growth and Economic
Development since 1750 (New York, 1971), p. 48 and passim; D. E. C. Eversley, “The
Home Market and Economic Growth in England, 1750–1780,” in E. L. Jones and
G. E. Mingay, eds., Land, Labour and Population in the Industrial Revolution (London,
1967), pp. 206–59.
