The Pursuit of Power. Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000

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230 Chapter Seven

Little changed technically; but then, other European armies also re­
mained generally content with the weapons and organization per­
fected during the Napoleonic Wars. The Russian navy was the third
largest of the world, lagging behind the British and French in technical
change, but not by much, as the dramatic destruction of the Turkish
fleet at Sinope in 1853 attested.
To take on such a behemoth and yet prevail was quite a feat for the
French and British expeditionary forces in the Crimea. Their suc­
cess depended on superior supply. The Russians had great difficulty
delivering powder and other necessities to the forces defending Se­
vastopol. Access by sea was cut off by the Allies, and the Russians
found it all but impossible to traverse the empty steppeland to the
north of their Crimean naval base. Though something like 125,000
peasant carts were requisitioned for the purpose, deliveries could
never attain a satisfactory scale. Animals needed to eat, and forage
could not be found along the way after initial roadside stocks had been
depleted. But to carry enough forage to keep the draft animals in
shape en route meant that payloads dropped almost to nothing. By
comparison, the French and British expeditionary forces, supplied by
ship, were able to command a vast flow of supplies. To be sure, there
were initial disasters and mismanagement, and it took a while for
deliveries to get properly organized. Yet in the final days of the siege
the allies were able, in a single day, to fire as many as 52,000 cannon­
balls against Sevastopol’s fortifications, whereas the Russians had to
ration their guns for lack of sufficient powder and shot.^10
The Crimean War, in other words, reversed the supply situation of
1812, when Russian armies had profited from access to water trans­
portation while the invaders had been compelled to rely on overland
cartage. As a result, Russia’s big naval guns, however numerous and
however skillfully mounted in defense of Sevastopol, eventually
proved insufficient to counterbalance allied materiel superiority. After
a heroic defense, the garrison withdrew, thereby ending active hos­
tilities, since the Allies were quite unable to go in pursuit, and, by
capturing Sevastopol and destroying the Russian Black Sea fleet, they
had in fact achieved the goal of their campaign by making Con­
stantinople safe against naval attack from the north.
The siege of Sevastopol was a rehearsal in miniature for the Western
Front of World War I. Trench systems, field fortifications, and artillery
barrages became decisive. Only the machine gun was missing. On the



  1. I take these figures from Curtiss, ibid., pp. 339–40, 448.

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