Military-Industrial Interaction, 1884–1914^275
The scale of the program was officially justified by proclamation of a
“two-power standard.” This meant that the Royal Navy ought always
to be equal or superior to the combined forces of the next two largest
navies in the world. Only so, it was argued, could Britain’s security be
guaranteed against any and all contingencies.^22
A striking fact about 1889 program was that it exceeded what the
Admiralty had asked for. Personal initiative and purpose no longer
controlled what happened. Instead, organized groups interacted with
one another, creating a process more complicated than any of the par
ticipants could fully comprehend. But the upshot was unidirectional,
propelling the government to increased investment in armaments.
As in 1884, there were plenty of viewers-with-alarm on the English
side of the Channel. The French cooperated magnificently, partly by
themselves embarking in 1888 on a large-scale naval building cam
paign no longer limited to torpedo boats and cruisers; and partly by
unleashing a surge of jingoism focused upon the mock heroic figure of
General Boulanger. French jingoism wakened an answering note
across the channel. Britain’s most respected soldier, Lord Wolseley,
announced in the House of Lords that “so long as the Navy is as weak
as it is at the moment her Majesty’s army cannot.. .guarantee even
the safety of the capital in which we are at this moment.”^23 And the
prime minister, Lord Salisbury, convinced himself that “there are cir
cumstances under which a French invasion may be possible.”^24
The fact that even in a time of general prosperity the steel business
and shipbuilding were in difficulty added fuel to the fires of agitation.
But what most affected government thinking was the strategic calcu
lation that the French and Russian fleets, acting in concert, might be
able to drive the Royal Navy from the Mediterranean. In addition,
Conservative politicians like Lord George Hamilton, First Lord of the
Admiralty in 1889, recognized that naval appropriations were popular
and might help the party at the polls.^25
With party advantage, national interest, and popular enthusiasm all
- The two-power standard was attributed to William Pitt the Elder and thus ac
quired a respectable ancestry. But it had not been a guiding principle of British naval
policy throughout the intervening years as its proponents in 1889 declared to be the
case. Cf. Arthur Marder, British Naval Policy, 1880–1905: The Anatomy of British Sea
Power (London, n.d.), pp. 105–16.
- Hansard, 14 May 1888, vol. 326, col. 100.
- Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, 4:186.
- In memoirs written after World War I, Lord George remarked: “The great addi
tions to the electorate by the Reform Bill of 1884 had, to a large extent, swamped the
old niggardly and skinflint policy of the Manchester School. It is true that the mass of
the recently enfranchised escaped direct taxation out of which new burdens of expen-
