Military-Industrial Interaction, 1884–1914 291ralty on a quasi-public basis. That is to say, considerations of the politi
cal and economic consequences of how any big new contract was to be
shared out between the two great firms and their lesser rivals came to
be an important consideration in Admiralty decision-making, com
peting with and sometimes overriding simple pecuniary calculation.^49
In the foreign field, where competition with Krupp and the princi
pal French arms manufacturer, Schneider-Creusot, became intense
after 1885, considerations of national prestige, diplomatic alignments,
and outright bribery frequently entered into deciding what kind of
guns or warships a technically backward country would purchase.
Credit arrangements, often at least partly inspired by foreign offices’
representations to private bankers, were even more decisive, since
few of the arms-purchasing countries could come across with cash to
pay for the weaponry they wanted.
Once they had consolidated their position in the home market,
Vickers and Armstrong found it imprudent to compete against each
other abroad. By 1906, they had, in effect, achieved market-sharing
agreements covering most of the globe. In addition, patent and royalty
arrangements with Krupp gave the two British firms access to some of
Krupp’s metallurgical inventions, while Krupp got rights to certain
British patents in return. Schneider had similar arrangements too. In
this way an international arms ring, which became the object of in
tense opprobrium after World War I, came into existence. Pecuniary
considerations ordinarily dictated cooperation and collusive bidding
among the leading firms. On the other hand, political rivalries and na
tional pride made for cutthroat competition and sometimes set prices
at uneconomic levels. What really happened depended on how these
contrary forces interacted in each particular case.
Ever since the technological breakaway of the 1850s, private arms
manufacturers had prospered by entering the foreign market as a way
of increasing their income and smoothing out peaks and valleys
created by fluctuating home demand for their products. As long as in
vention and costs of development were met entirely by private firms,
this did not raise any particularly delicate moral questions; but after
- Two excellent books, Scott, Vickers. and Clive A. Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers:
Armaments and Enterprise, 1854–1914 (London, 1977) provide the main basis for these
remarks. Noel-Baker, Private Manufacture of Armaments, vol. 1, and Helmut Carl
Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen, Merchants of Death: A Study of the International Arma
ments Industry (New York, 1934) express the hostile, scandal-mongering outlook that
prevailed in the 1930s; Dougan, The Great Gunmaker: The Story of Lord Armstrong
partakes of the apologetic tradition instead, though all contain relevant if sometimes
unreliable information.