(^352) Chapter Nine
supported by superior air power, could do to disorganize and demor
alize the rear of an army that did not want to fight. As a result, Hitler
won his greatest victory in May 1940.
The shock of France’s fall jarred Great Britain into an all-out effort
to safeguard itself from the same fate. Financial limits were withdrawn,
and manpower became the principal factor defining what could and
could not be done. Management of the war effort benefited from
economic theory as developed between the wars as well as from World
War I experience. The result was relatively smooth and effective
industrial-military effort, sustained by an all but universal popular will
to resist the Germans to the end.^79 The United States also stepped up
its mobilization at home in reaction to the fall of France, and through
the Lend Lease Act (March 1941) made supplies available to the
British and to other governments at war with Germany and Japan
without requiring or expecting full repayment afterwards. The un
collectible war debts that had blighted international relations between
the wars were thereby avoided, despite the fact that the United States
began to develop a symbiotic relationship with the British war econ
omy that far surpassed anything attained in World War I. Stalin, on
the other hand, in an effort to avoid provoking Hitler, seems to have
done little to hurry Russian arms production or reorganize the Red
Army after a demoralizing purge of officers in 1937–38. Instead, the
Russian dictator sought to assure peace by punctual delivery of large
quantities of raw materials and food to Germany as promised in trade
agreements supplementary to the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement of
August 1939–^80 This made nonsense of the British blockade.and
allowed Germany to persist in its prewar policy of refraining from
drastic mobilization. Even when, in the fall of 1940, Hitler decided to
attack Russia before making peace with Great Britain, the Germans
did not depart from this principle. As a result, when German tanks
began to roll into Russia in June 1941, the German arms industry was
beginning to convert to production for intensified war at sea and in the
air against Great Britain.^81
- W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, British War Economy (London, 1949) is an
admirable official history that highlights critical decisions of policy. Postan’s British War
Production is an equally admirable official history of arms manufacture. - Ericson, Soviet High Command', pp. 575–83.
- Alan S. Milward, The German Economy at War (London, 1965), pp. 43–45; Barry
A. Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 1939–1941 (Oxford, 1973), pp. 133–46 and
passim; B. Klein, Germany's Economic Preparation for War (Cambridge, Mass., 1959);
Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler's Strategic: Politik und Kriegsjilhrung, 1940–1941 (Frankfurt
am Main, 1965), pp. 155–66 and passim.