34 Chapter Tworesponse was to rely initially on a “scorched earth” policy that aimed at
bringing everything of value within city walls.^23 If raiders lingered, the
central imperial field army, normally stationed in the environs of the
capital, could be sent to harass and drive back the intruders. The field
army was partly a cavalry force; its role was as much to countervail and
overawe potentially rebellious border units as to protect the interior
from barbarian raiding.^24
This strategy became inadequate only if raiding parties snowballed
into really large invading armies and acquired the organization and
weaponry needed to attack city walls with success. This is what hap
pened in 1127 when the Jürchen conquered K’ai-feng. To guard
against such disaster, Sung policy relied on diplomacy, buying im
munity from raids with “gifts” to powerful barbarian neighbors. From
a nomad chieftain’s point of view, luxury goods received as gifts in
connection with diplomatic intercourse (in exchange, to be sure, for
horses or other gifts from him to make the transaction symmetrical)
often seemed better than the randomly assorted objects that could be
secured by plunder.
From the viewpoint of Chinese officialdom, a passive defense policy
had the advantage of making it easier to assure civilian dominance
within China. An army that was assigned to garrison duty and seldom
took the field for active campaigning could be kept in leading-strings
by carefully regulating its flow of supplies. Civilian officials, charged
with the duty of providing food and weapons to local military com
manders, could in any dispute expect to balance one military leader off
against another. This made it relatively easy to nip rebelliousness in
the bud, should any military captain find himself tempted to bring
armed force to bear on decision-making at imperial headquarters.^25 If
- Cf. Herbert Franke, “Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China,” in Frank
A. Kierman, Jr., and John K. Fairbank, eds., Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge,
Mass., 1974), pp. 151–201. - Laurence J. C. Ma, Commercial Development and Urban Change in Sung China
(960–1279) (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1971), p. 100. An encyclopedia of the Sung period
summed up the military policy of the founder of the dynasty as follows: “He compre
hended the value of strengthening the root and weakening the branches.” Wang
Ying-lin, Yü Hai, cited in Lo Ch’iu-ch’ing, “Pei-sung ping-chih yen-chiu” (The military
service of the northern Sung Dynasty), Hsin-ya Hsueh-pao (New Asia Journal), 3
(1957): 180, translated by Hugh Scogin. - The risk of military rebellion by border troops had been vividly demonstrated
under the T’ang when a barbarian general rebelled in 755 and nearly toppled that
dynasty from the throne. The rebellion did paralyze the central civilian administration,
making the next two hundred years of Chinese history a period of thinly veiled local
warlordism. It was in reaction to this experience that Sung military policy was devised
soon after the country was (mostly) reunited under an unusually successful warlord,