The Pursuit of Power. Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000

(Brent) #1
The Era of Chinese Predominance, 1000–1500^41

expansion, and military expansion were built into the Chinese system
of political administration.
The career of a twelfth-century ironmaster named Wang Ko offers
an instructive example in parvo of how the system worked, though
obviously he represents an extreme case. Starting from nothing, Wang
Ko became a rather considerable ironmaster in south-central China,
with something like five hundred men in his employ. His furnaces
used charcoal, not coke; indeed, his initial start came from getting
possession of a tree-covered mountainside where charcoal could be
produced. For reasons not clearly stated in the surviving record, Wang
Ko quarreled with local officials in 1181. When they sent a detach­
ment of soldiers to enforce their will, he mobilized his workmen to
beat them off, and then followed up with an attack on the town where
the officials resided. But his workmen deserted him; he had to flee,
and was later caught and executed.^36 Such a career shows how eco­
nomic entrepreneurship and irregular exercise of armed force could
merge into one another; and how entrenched officialdom enforced its
will against both forms of impropriety.
Yet going over to a cash basis for government finance in the
eleventh century risked infection of officialdom itself by the commer­
cial mentality. This became most clearly apparent in south China.
South of the Yangtse, a mountainous topography hindered transport
by canals and riverways. Merchants had therefore to take to the open
sea, and once sea trade among Chinese coastal provinces became well
established, it was easy to extend trade relations to more distant parts.
Indeed, commerce with populations that were not subject to imperial
administration could be made to contribute handsomely to govern­
mental income through excise taxes. Officials managing such taxes
sometimes sought to promote overseas trade in a spirit reminiscent of
mercantilist Europe, and might even invest government funds in ven­
tures that promised to increase income and bring back rare and valued
goods. In words attributed to the emperor himself:‘‘The profits from
maritime commerce are very great. If properly managed they can be
millions. Is it not better than taxing the people?”^37 The emperor knew
whereof he spoke, for by 1137 something like a fifth of his govern­
ment’s income came from excise taxes on maritime trade.^38



  1. Wolfram Eberhard, “Wang Ko: An Early Industrialist,” Oriens 10 (1957): 248–52,
    tells this tale.

  2. Ma, Commençai Development and Urban Change in Sung China, p. 34. The phrases
    come from an imperial decree issued in 1137.

  3. Ibid., p. 38. Cf. Lo Jung-pang, “Maritime Commerce and Its Relation to the Sung
    Navy.”JESHO 12 (1969): 61–68.

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