The Era of Chinese Predominance, 1000–1500 43materials required for shipbuilding—timbers, rope, sails, fittings—
were added to the relatively complex requirements land forces had
already imposed on the Chinese economy. An urban base and a
market-articulated supply system were even more essential than be
fore; but the passive defense policy pursued by the northern Sung was
modified by the fact that the new warships were quite mobile and
could be concentrated against an attacker far more readily than in
fantry forces could ever be.
When, in due course, the armies of Genghis Khan overran the
Jürchen domains in north China and then, after a pause of half a
century, attacked the south as well, they had first to overcome the
navy that had long been the principal bulwark of the Sung regime.
This required Kublai Khan to build a navy of his own. With its help he
besieged Hsiang-yang, one of the main Sung strongholds on the
Yangtse River, for five years before being able to break through.
Thereafter, most of the Sung navy went over to the victors, making
the final stages of the conquest comparatively easy.^41
After his victory, Kublai continued to build up his naval strength
but changed its character, since the subsequent naval enterprises he
undertook were ventures overseas. Accordingly, ships designed to
navigate the open oceans became the backbone of the Chinese fleet.^42
Yet despite a truly imperial scale of construction—it is recorded that a
total of 4,400 ships attempted the invasion of Japan in 1281—Kublai’s
naval expeditions met with no enduring success. Japanese warriors, in
combination with an opportune typhoon, destroyed the invading force
of 1281; and a later venture against Java (1292), though it met with
initial victories, also failed to establish enduring control over that
distant island.
What might have been more significant for the long run (but turned
out not to be) was the use of seagoing ships to supplement grain
deliveries from south to north along the inland waterways. By the
early part of the fourteenth century, as much grain was carried in
seagoing vessels as moved on the canals. Improvement of navigation
techniques shortened the trip from the Yangtse mouth to Tientsin to
- For details of the naval war see Jose Din Ta-san and F. Olesa Munido, El poder naval
chino desde sus o ri genes hasta la caida de la Dinastia Ming (Barcelona, 1965), pp. 96–98. - Needham, Science and Civilization in China 3, pt. 3, sec. 29, “Nautical Technol
ogy,” pp. 379–699, constitutes a thorough and persuasive study of Chinese shipbuilding
and naval history. My remarks on naval development derive mainly from this work,
supplemented by Din Ta-san and Olesa Munido, El poder naval chino, and by three
articles by Lo Jung-pang, “China as a Sea Power,” Ear Eastern Quarterly 14 (1955):
489–503; “The Decline of the Early Ming Navy,” Oriens extremus 5 (1958): 149–68; and
“Maritime Commerce and Its Relation to the Sung Navy,” JESHO 12 (1969): 57–107.