The Pursuit of Power. Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000

(Brent) #1
The Era of Chinese Predominance, 1000–1500 47

would not sacrifice their lives abroad, the people from afar would
voluntarily submit and distant lands would come into our fold, and
our dynasty would last for 10,000 generations.^50

Given the choice between defense of a threatened frontier close to the
new capital at Peking and costly offensive operations overseas, it is not
hard to understand why the Ming authorities opted for retrenchment.
A further consideration which may have played a part was this: in
1417, construction of deep-water locks was completed throughout the
length of the Grand Canal connecting the Yangtse with the Yellow
River valleys. Such locks were newly invented, and their construction
meant that vessels could use the canal twelve months in the year
without having to worry about high and low water. Always before, for
about six months of the year, the canal had been unavailable to large
boats, and sometimes traffic halted completely until the rains raised
the water level. Building new locks assured year-round grain deliver­
ies to the north via inland water routes. Reliance on ocean shipping to
supplement traffic in the Grand Canal became unnecessary, and there
was no longer any need to police the high seas to assure sufficient food
for the capital. Officials, therefore, saw no compelling reason to au­
thorize the heavy expenditures needed to keep the navy in a state of
readiness. Accordingly they let it quietly disintegrate.
What about private entrepreneurs’ interest in ocean voyaging?
Clearly, the livelihood of several thousand persons depended on the
overseas trading that had flourished so markedly in the coastal cities of
south China. These traders and sailors did not tamely submit when the
government prohibited foreign trade in 1371, with periodic reaffir­
mations across the ensuing two centuries.^51 Overseas voyages con­
tinued, though on a reduced scale, since the costs of doing business
outside the law were significantly higher than before. Bribing officials
to overlook illegal transactions usually cost more than the 10–20 per­
cent levies in kind assessed on foreign goods under the Sung in the
time when Chinese overseas trade had swelled so rapidly.^52 The pos-



  1. A memorial written by Fan Chi and quoted by Lo Jung-pang, “The Decline of the
    Early Ming Navy,” p. 167. For details of this decision to withdraw see Lo Jung-pang,
    “Policy Formulation and Decision Making,” in Hucker, Chinese Government in Ming
    Times, pp. 56–60.

  2. Prohibition of overseas trade was renewed in 1390, 1394, 1397, 1433, 1449, and
    1452 according to Matsui Masato, “The Wo-K’uo Disturbances of the 1550’s,” East
    Asian Occasional Papers 1 (Asian Studies Program, University of Hawaii, Honolulu,
    1969), PP. 97–107.

  3. Jitsuzo Kuwabara, “P’u Shou-keng: A Man of the Western Regions,” Memoirs of
    the-Research Department of the Toyo Bunko 7 (1935): 66.

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