110 The Warrior Tsar, 1689-1725
led to manifold abuses and even to mutiny, as in 1682. It was to prove a vexing
problem for the authorities throughout the Imperial era. In principle a soldier
in the regular army $ervcd the :sar alone. Bui. if ihc: siate couid not or would
not pay him an adequate wage, and he could obtain a little extra from private
sources, should he not be allowed to come to an arrangement with a superior
officer, provided that his services could be spared? The first of many 'blanket
orders condemning the practice was promulgated as early as 1696: officers
were not to employ men in their homes, or to have them plough, reap, catch
fish, or cut timber on their behalf; instead they were assigned orderlies on a
fixed scale according to their rank.^80 These orderlies occupied a kind of limbo
between the civilian and military sectors: their masters were responsible for
their conduct and provided their uniforms; but in an emergency they were
expected to serve and they received pay at a rate half that of a soldier.^81 But in
1710 naval officers were permitted to employ sailors with the sanction of
higher authority, and six years later this rule was extended to the army as well.
The men were suppo~ed to volunteer for the job (an unrealistic provision in the
circumstances); they were not to be given heavy, unhealthy, or humiliating
work; the authorities were to be kept informed; and they were to be paid. The
rates were at first left to the employing officer's discretion, but in 1724 were
fixed at 5 kopecks a day, the same as for peasant labourers.^82 Russia was now
at peace; most of the troops had been settled in rural areas, and soldiers formed a
ready pool of agricultural labour. Evidently there was no lack of demand
among soldiers for civilian work, since they were allowed to complain if men
were allotted jobs out of turn. They could also engage in craft activity during
their free time-and presumably sell the product. All this showed that the
economic life of Peter's standing army preserved more than a trace of an earlier
era when self-support had been the rule.
A regular army presupposed regular pay-such as had in fact been issued to
soldiers in the new-model forces. Although the historical literature gives a con-
trary impression, the reign of the tsar-reformer brought no significant progress
in this respect and may even have marked a step backwards. The soldiers who
enlisted in 1699, as we know, were promised 11 roubles a year, but this wealth
turned out to be a mirage, for as much as 5 roubles of the sum might be
deducted to pay for uniforms and other items of personal equipment.^83 There
was no guarantee that they would get even this. Already in 1700 men were
petitioning that they had received nothing, although the money had been given
by their proprietors on induction was exhausted.^84 The problem was partly one
of inefficient administration: the old prikaz structure had been left to decay
but nothing better had been put in its place. The Office for Military Affairs,
so PSZ iii. 1540 (8 Feb. 1696), § 12.
s1 PSZ v. 2638 (28 Jan. 1713); cf. 2456 (10 Dec. 1711), § 18.
82 Voinskiye anikuly, §§ 54-5 (PRP viii. 333); PSZ vii. 4535 (26 June 1724). §10; Bobrovsky,
Voyennoye pravo, ii. 240-2.
83 PiB xii(ii), p. 282; cf. x. 3571, 4121. 84 Rabinovich, 'formirovaniye', p. 231.
wang
(Wang)
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