The Noble Servitor and the Petrine State 127when he fell from grace-president of the War College, the most powerful of
the new central government departments (kollegi1). Menshikov was sensitive
about his humble origins, which were held against him by members of the old
families, and tried to compensate for this liability by acquiring vast personal
wealth, often by unscrupulous means; he was notoriously corrupt and it was
this vice that led to his demotion. More to the point, Menshikov's only power
base was in the army, particutarly in the guards. He was the first Russian
politician outside the dynasty to cultivate this source of support in order to
build up his standing. It seems to have been his lobbying that secured for
guards officers a two-rank seniority over their opposite numbers in the army,
as against the one-rank seniority which Peter had originally suggested.^43 Men-
shikov commanded (nominally at least) a regiment, the Ingermanlandsky,
which, like the Butyrsky, enjoyed an elevated status close to that of the three
guards regiments proper. This unit was remarkable for the fact that it contained
the highest proportion of non-gentry officers (18 out of 56) in the entire army. 44
The prince clearly favoured and protected ambitious plebeian elements whose
careers in some respects resembled his own. More than any other member of
Peter's entourage, he detested aristocratic ideals and advocated close state
regulation of all noble servitors, irrespective of birth. This principle was dear
to the tsar as well, but Peter evidently felt it necessary to temporize and did not
give in wholly to military pressure.
In the course of the discussion the War College objected to the use in the
Table of Ranks of a term for nobility, znatnost ', which had aristocratic con-
notations, and wanted this to be clearly defined; however, it failed to win this
point.^45 It was more successful in getting provisions incorporated in the decree
that were designed to prevent young nobles who joined the civil service from
being promoted straight to high rank, as was very likely to occur given the
dearth of administrative talent. This, the army leaders felt, would be 'insulting
to military men who earned their rank by performing service for many years
under harsh conditions', and accordingly such individuals had to start off as
trainees (kol/egii-yunkery or 'college cadets') without any rank, much like
those who served as common soldiers before becoming officers.^46
The overall result of Peter I's measures was to strengthen the Crown's
prerogatives over members of the privileged classes, whose career patterns
were regulated from above and, up to a point, 'homogenized'. Unless they
happened to be the sole inheritors of a large estate, they were expected to serve
for an unlimited term in the armed forces or civil administration; if they chose(^43) Troitsky, Absolyutizm, pp. 77, 78 n.; Shepelev, Otmenennye istoriyey, p. 27; PSZ v. 3332.
44 Rabinovich, 'Sots. proiskhozhdeniye', p. 153.
(^4) s Troitsky, Absolyutizm, pp. 96-7. Rabinovich ('Sots. proiskhozhdeniye', p. 170) suggests, on
the basis or a casual instruction by Peter in 1718, that znatnye officers were exempt from tor-
ture; but this was not a secure legal right. The term znatnye also occurs in § 14, where it is
employed in a different sense.
46 An exception was made for those who were particularly well qualified educationally: §§ 13-
14; Troitsky, Absolyutizm, pp. 106-7.