Soldiers of the Tsar. Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874 - John L. Keep

(Wang) #1
The Noble Servitor and the Petrine State 137

largely self-supporting. For the purposes of calculating the poll tax, Peter
rounded off the establishment figures to 4 million roubles: 3 million for the
active army and I million for the garrison troops. The guards and artillery
were maintained from sources other than the poll tax, as was the navy.
Total state expenditure, ;ii:-tu?.! and assigned, iii l 720 was probabiy in the
region of 5 million roubles (precise figures are not available),^86 and the armed
forces proportion will have accounted for well over four-fifths.


General staff (generolitet)
Guards
Cavalry
Infantry and miscellaneousb
Total active army
Artillery<
Garrison troops: cavalry
infantry


Total regulars


Table 2

Estimated numbers

360
5,817
39,501
57,956
lOJ,634
3,526
69,869

177,029
a 1 ncluding supplies of food and fodder.

Estimated cost
('(JOO roubles, rounded)•

163
156
1,389
1.427
3, 135
195
88
873
4,291

b Including 3 grenadier regiments in the cavalry and 5 in the infantry, as well as 1 detached
infantry battalion.
r Not covered in Table, 1711 establishment figures; actual size ca. 4,000?
Sources: PSZ xliii. 3511, p. 36 (Table VI); Stein, Gescliichte, pp. 81-3; Solov·yev, 'Kratkiy
ochcrk ', p. 227.


The data for 1724, the last full year of Peter's reign, are so contradictory
that, although they are often referred to in secondary works, they are best
ignored; those for the following year, which have recently been scrutinized by
S. M. Troitsky, are more rewarding. Despite the conclusion of peace with
Sweden, Russia was still at war, with Persia, and her total effectives, at least
on paper, were higher than before. Details are set out in Table 3. This probably
overstates the actual number of troops but understates expenditure on military
administration and arms production. If total state expenditure in 1725 was a
little over 9 million (9, 141,000) roubles, the armed forces component was 73.2
per cent-about half-way between what it had been in 1680 (62 per cent) and in
the crisis years 1701-8 (80.3 per cent).^87 Post-Petrine leaders did not indulge in
such computations, but readily appreciated that military expenditure had risen
to an unacceptable level and sought to reduce it.

(^86) Milyukov, Gos. khoz. Rossii, pp. 661, 663; the total officially recorded, a li1tle under 3
million, is ~learly a gross underestimate.
(^87) Our calculation; Klyuchevsky, taking the (dubious) 1724 figures, put it at 67 per cent of
estimated and nearly 17.5 per cent of actual revenue (not expenditure). Soch., iv. 143 (Peter the
Great, p. 176).

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