144 The Imperial Century, 1725-1825whose title and rank give him preference over that of any previous calling'.^2
Something of this attitude was assimilated by the men concerned, who came to
see themselves as professionals whose work was honourable as well as
onerous. No doubt they were respected as such by many ~ivi!!an commoner$.
On the other hand the serviceman was exposed to a higher risk of sickness and
mortality-from disease as much as from enemy action-by the very nature of
his duties and life-style; he was largely isolated from the peasant milieu from
which he had been forcibly ripped by the act of recruitment; and he was sub-
ject to a system of discipline so strict, yet at the same time so arbitrary, that it
inured him to violence and brutality while fortifying that spirit of servile
fatalism so characteristic of the Russian masses under the old regime.
Limiting ourselves initially to the hundred years that ended with the death of
Alexander I (1801-25), we may consider first the soldier's recruitment into the
forces and his juridical situation, and then his material (ch. 8) and cultural life
'.ch. 9). Soldiers did not write memoirs,^3 and where direct evidence of social
·ealities is lacking official records must do duty instead. Fortunately the surfeit
)f paperwork in the Imperial army that so irritated the more energetic officers
lields some useful information.
On few questions are the published materials so plentiful as on recruitment.
['his is not surprising, for this operation, together with collection of the poll
ax, which was related to it, served as the principal point of contact, so to
peak, between the autocracy and its subjects. Almost every year, generally in
ate summer, the sovereign, or the Senate acting in his or her name, would
sue a decree ordering that a levy be raised. This ukaz, as a rule accompanied
1y an Imperial manifesto, laid down how many individuals were to be taken
rom a given number of 'souls', which groups if any were to be exempted, and
1hat procedure was to be followed. Despite several efforts at reform, to be
xamined shortly, the system remained remarkably resistant to change
uoughout this hundred-year period and even beyond. It was a very oppressive
urden, not only for the men who were enlisted and their families, but also
hough in a different sense) for those who provided them, their 'donors'
'Jtdatchik1) as they were known in official jargon.^4 The government issued
:ereotyped injunctions to avoid 'undue burdening of the people' (lishnogo
arodnogo istyagoshcheniya), but paradoxically precisely those efforts,
uplicated at the local level, to ensure that the load was shared fairly did much
f the harm. For this task surpassed the modest capacities of the primitive
ureaucratic apparatus. It was not just a matter of the human frailties
1anifested by the officials and officers in charge, nor even of the devious
1eans employed by potential recruits and their donors to evade their unen-
able fate. The underlying reason for the misery which recruitment caused
2 PSZ xvi. 12289, V, § 3 (Instruction to Infantry Colonels, 8 Dec. 1764).
3 With a few minor exceptions: see Keep, 'Pistol', p. 315, n. 5.
4 The terminology employed in recruitment would repay study. Donors might be landowners
, in non-proprietorial communities, cho~en representatives of the local population.