Recruitment and Service in the Ranks 149land owners too, sought to extend the coverage to include those less well off,
that is, families with at least two members (so-called 'solitaries' with relatives
to support were generally exempted), although this meant that they iucurred
he~'.'ier fin~nci~! obligations, since they haj to iudp pay Lhe dues of those sent
and to care for their more indigent dependants.^24 The general (but not univer-
sal) trend in the late eighteenth century was to take as the basis the individual
household, and eventually all its constituent male members-so in effect
anticipating the selective conscription system that would become law in 1874.
Those for whom military service would mean the collapse of their precarious
economies were granted various financial easements and encouraged to hire
substitutes; and since this latter course was beyond the reach of most peasants,
complicated accounting arrangements were devised whereby most or all
members of the community (and sometimes even several villages) pooled their
resources to find the necessary sum, the economically weaker elements bor-
rowing the money. Householders thereby became owners of fractional shares
(doll) of a (sometimes theoretical!) substitute, and could trade these shares
among one another.^25 Selection was often carried out by lot; if a share-owner
were nevertheless called on to serve, his share would be returned to his family.
This system enhanced the power of the paterfamilias, who could in practice
decide which of his kinsmen should vanish; he might well spare his sons and
send cousins or nephews instead.^26 It helped to keep households large, since
partition increased the chances of drawing the fatal lot.^27 It may also have kept
down the rate of marriage, for although young married men with families
stood less chance of being called up, they could not marry without permission
of the paterfamilias, and this he might deny to a lad whom he had earmarked
as a recruit. These adverse demographic effects, and the tensions that
developed within and between households, far outweighed any positive gain
which the hiring of substitutes brought by encouraging the circulation of
money. There was also the factor that the recruiting system increased peasant
indebtedness and contributed greatly to the spread of corruption. Wealthy
families might secure favourable treatment by bribing the communal elders
(normally elected from their midst), the district clerk, the county police official
(ispravnik: from 1775)^28 -or even the receiving officer and members of the
recruitment board. In 1795 the despatch of 18 recruits from the Perm' estate of
G. A. Stroganov cost the donors 460 roubles, including bribes of 25 roubles to
the doctor, 15 to an official of the Kazennaya palata, and smaller sums to
officers and NCOs, one of whom marked up the height of undersized
recruits.^29 Normally the military men made their views known only if the
recruits submitted were clearly unfit, whereupon they would demand replace-
ments and take action against the donors for attempted fraud. The latter,
24 Ibid., p. 248. 25 Ibid., p. 269.
26 Ibid., p. 287. 21 Ibid., p. 288.
28 Bolotenko, 'Adminis1ra1ion', pp. 383-400; Semevsky, Krest'yone, i. 365.
29 Aleksandrov, Se/. obshchino, p. 285.