158 The Imperial Century, 1725-1825orders not to drill them extensively, to employ them on work details, or other-
wise to oppress them, for it was realized that such abuses would delay the
men's arrival in the unit and make them still more disenchanted.^81 The convoy
was seen as a means of accustoming recruits to the military life-stylr hefort'
they were expQsed to the full ardours of the service. On the march they were
required to cover 20 to 30 versts a day (half that distance in inclement
weather), with a rest every third day; they were inspected twice daily and once
a week spent the rest period washing their clothes and mending their boots.
These rules, like so many others, were not always kept to in practice. Vyazem-
sky states that the squad officer 'tries to space out the money in his care as is
most convenient for himself, and if he is severe into the bargain he tortures the
unfortunate recruits with beatings'.^82
While in the convoy the men had better opportunities for escape than they
were likely to have later as soldiers. This is why elaborate rules were devised to
ensure that squads kept to the designated route (even if it were rendered
unsuitable by flooding etc.), avoided taverns, and were closely supervised
when in their billets.^83 If recruits fell seriously ill and had to be left behind,
they were supposed to be looked after by army medical personnel. Should their
own supplies be exhausted before they reached their destination, they were to
be fed at state expense, and the portions of those who died or deserted were
distributed as a bonus among the rest. 84
These rules testify to an awareness on the authorities' part that recruits
needed to be treated with a minimum of care, if only because they represented
a finite resource. This was no more than a common-sense attitude, based on
concern for state interests rather than the influence of Enlightened thought.
Yet the principles of the levy were called into question by individual Russians
from the start. Already during Peter I's reign, as we have seen, Pososhkov had
pleaded for a 'cadre army' that would make up in quality for what it lacked in
quantity; but his well-intentioned suggestions were not even considered by the
authorities and may even have contributed to his death in prison. Thereafter
major wars gave a periodic impetus to reformist ideas. In 1731 Mtinnich (or,
as Soviet investigators insist, the Russian statesman P. I. Yaguzhinsky) put
forward a plan for the tax-paying population to be divided into 'companies' of
500 men organized into ten sections, each of which should supply a recruit
once in ten years.^85 The scheme is said to have been opposed by self-interested
landowners; whether this was the case or not, it would have required con-
81 PSZ xiv. 10786 (23 Dec. 1757), II,§§ 6, 30-1, xvii. 12748 (29 Sept. 1766), §§ 2-5.
82 Vyazemsky, ·zapiska', p. 5.
83 PSZ xxviii. 21490 (Oct. 1804), §§ 12-13, 19(4). xxix. 22577 (July 1807), xxx. 23297 (10 Oct.
I 808), § 53.
84 PSZ xiv. !0789 (23 Dec. 1757), II,§§ 13-14, 17, 21, xv. 10788 (9 Jan. 1758), ch. IX, xv. 10928
21 Feb. 1759), xvii. 12748 (29 Sept. 1766), II,§§ 7-10, 15-17.
8S Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya, p. 34 and in Baranovich et al. (eds.), Ocherki, p. 300 (not
mblished).